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Agency and Respondent.

completed.its appellate reYiew of the above-entitled case v-:ith a hearing involving the parties and m1
executive session. The following Board members were present and heard orJ.l argument at the
hearing .:md
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Robert E. Steele (Grievants/Appellants) 1 vvere present and represented by Phillip '\Y. =:- ,/ ~~, AtL::r:1ey
at Law, who presented oral argument on Appellants' behalf. Carey A. Seager, Attorney at Law, was
..;,1~u

present m1d assisted :!'Jr. Dyer at Counsel" stable. Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Steed,

representc.: ~l:;;; D:.::pJ.:·::~l:::n. ~: -=~~_;_;.;v:iv_;_ls (Deparm1ent and DOC/ vvith Linda V/hitney ili'ld
-------------1Messrs.

Vl. Fred Hurst and Harold Johnson were not present at this Board hearing. However, they
are proper parties to this appeal and are specifically referenced whenever the Board refers to "Appellants"
in this Decision and Final Agency Action.

Steed wrote the Agency's Response to Grievants' Step 6 Brief on Appeal to the Career Service
Review Board from the Remand Decision of the Step 5 Hearing Officer (Agency's Response Brief After
Remand) and presented oral argument on behalf of the Department at the January 21, 2004 Board hearing.
However, Assistant Attomey General Patrick B. Nolan represented the Department at the "Remand"
evidentiary hearing held in front of Hearing Officer K. Allan Zabel on December 5, 2002. Mr. Nolan also
represented the Department during Appellants' initial appeal to the Board of the Hearing Officer's
October 12, 2001, Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine Including Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision (Decision 1). This representation included preparing a brief on
behalf of the Department and presenting oral argument at the initial Board hearing held on August 7, 2002.
Prior to Mr. Nolan, the Department was represented by Assistant Attomey General Dary·l RP11 a~ well.
2Mr.

I II II ILl

'. r

:1l

Lori Worthington present as the Department's management ::.-epresentati-,Ts.

Al!THORITY
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code Annotated at§§ 67-19a-101
through -408 (Su;p 7C)!JJ.t)

(h~reinafter

Utah Code) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal

Procedures Act, which is a sub-pan of Lhc "C"tah Stat-.: Pcrsonnd ~lar1agement Act CCSP?vfA) at

§§ 67-19 et seq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the Utah A.annmsrrrmvo 1 nde at
Rl.37-1-1 through -23 (Supp. 1998).

This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final

administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Messrs. Hurst,
Johnson, Leatham,

Slu~cun ..:G.l,_:

Steele's appeal of the denial of their sala_ry and personnel rule

violation grievance. Both the Board· s ev1dentiary/Step 5 and these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are
designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to R137-1-18(2)(a). Therefore, those :'-oy:sions of
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (CAP A) pertaining to formal adjudications are applicable
+,- +"h,.

f''-'P"l:l.'"

'-'+"'::'" ..,,..,d

~tep

6 hearings.(§§ 63-46b et seq.)

IROCEDLKAL BACKGROUND
On January 30,

:ns, Appellants filed a f,rrie-vance with the Department concerning "on-call

compensation" and violation of State personnel rules. 3 Appellants' January 30. 1998 "Statement nf
Grievance" provides specifically as follows:
Statement of Grievance:
State of Utah Human Resource lVlanagerm:uL ku~" \;u:y J._;_; -; 1
Conditions, Hours Worked On-r:1ll Time. states:

.;.... ,

1

,-<.J.\01\'-J

\Yorking

''On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available
for on-call work shall be compensated for on-call time at the rate of 1 hour
for everv 12 hours the emp]ovee is on-call''
Vie have been required by our employer to be on --..::4 nour

e~w

Mr. Bell filed the original Motion to Dismiss and Afotion in Lintin~:: (~vfulion to Dismiss) which were granted
by the Hearing Officer on October 12, 2001. (Decision 1) Mr. Bell also prepared the Memoranda in
Opposition to Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration >vhich the Hearing Officer denied on December 26,
2001. (Decision on Motion for Reconsideration) Finally, Assistant Attorney General David Gardner also
represented the Department for a brief period oftime during these proceedings.
3The

Board is cognizant of the continued uncertainty as to the specific date Appellants filed their
grievance in this matter. Therefore, as set forth more fully at pages 13-15 below, the Board fmds that
Appellants filed their initial grievance with the Department on Friday, January 30, 1998. This fmding is
made pursuant to CSRB rule Rl37-1-22(4)(a).
Hurst, Johnson, Learham, Slocum and Slc;ele v. Correcnons,
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We have not been receiving 1 hour of compensation for every 12 hours we have been
required to be "On-call".
Remedy or Relief Sought:
We want to be made whole for the lost "On-call" compensation we have not received. 4

The CSRB received this grievance on Thursday, February 5, 1998. 5
On February 6, 1998, Appellant's received a Level III grievance response from Frederick Van
Der Veur, Director, Division of Institutional Operations for the Department. 6 In his response,

Mr. Van Der Veur specifically denied Appellants' requested relief and alerted them of the
opportunity to advance their grievance to the next level of the State's Grievance and Appeal
Procedures. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101 et seq.; CSRB rule R137-1-14) 7 The CSRB received

4At

the time Appellants filed this grievance, DHRM rule concerning "on-call" compensation
provided as follows:
On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call work
shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee
is on-call.

(i) Time is considered "on-call time" when the employee has freedom ofmovement
in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty.
(ii) Employees record on-call time as "on-call paid" not as "hours worked" on
their time sheet, and shall be paid the following pay period Any time actually
worked during the on-call period is recorded in increments of15 minutes as "hours
worked" in addition to on-call time.
Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rule R477-8-6(8)(c)(i)(ii)
5Though not specifically specified in the Appellants' "Statement of Grievance," it is clear that
Appellants seek compensation for "On-call time" for a period offour years preceding the date they filed their
grievance. (Tr. at 131; Grievants' Step 6 Brief on Appeal to the Career Service Review Board from the
Remand to the Step 5 Hearing Officer at 15 (Appellant's Step 6 Brief on Appeal After Remand), Grievants'
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Agency's Motion to Dismiss and in Limine at 6-7
(Appellant's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), Decision 1 at 4, Grievants' Step 6 Brief on Appeal to the
Career Service Review Board from the Decisions of the Step 5 Hearing Officer at 9, and 9 at n.lO
(Appellant's Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal), Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Decision After
Remand at 6, 8, n.l (Decision2))
6 This

response dated February 6, 1998, serves as conclusive proof that the Department received
Appellant's grievance sometime prior to February 6, 1998.
6, 1998 response, Mr. VanDer Veur also stated that he was "waiving the level land
II responses due to the multiple supervisors involved and my belief that this claim should be addressed at the
Department level."
7Inhis February

Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65

Page 3

000492

lvfr. VanDer Veur's Level ill response on February 11, 1998. 8

Thereafter, Appellant's appropriately advanced their grievance to the executive director of
the Department. 9 On July 30, 1999, Appellants, through their legal counsel, Mr. Phillip W. Dyer,
filed a motion to amend their grievance to assert a claim of overtime compensation under
Article XVI, Section 6, ofthe Utah Constitution. 10 This section of the Utah Constitution provides
in pertinent part that "eight hours shall constitute a day's work on all works or undertakings carried
on or aided by the State, County, or Municipal governments .... " In connection with this motion,
Appellants asserted, through their counsel, that Article XVI, Section 6, entitled them to
compensation at a rate oftime and one-half (1/2) for any and all work performed in excess of eight
hours per day. 11
On February 7, 2000, R. Spencer Robinson (ALJ Robinson), Administrative Law Judge for
the Department, issued his order denying Grievants' Motion to Amend. 12

In his denial,

ALJ Robinson reasoned that because "on-call hours" are not hours actually worked nor are they part

8This

Level ill grievance response is part of the file maintained by the CSRB.

9Though CSRB rule R13 7-1-14 uses the term "steps" to describe a grievance as it progresses through
the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures, the Department of Corrections commonly refers to these steps
as "levels". Thus, executive director or department level grievances are referred to as Level IV grievances
by the Department of Corrections.

10This

motion and the accompanying memorandums of support and opposition to it are also part of
the file maintained by the CSRB and is specifically referenced in the Department's Final Order dated
January 19, 2001, and by the Hearing Officer in Decision 1.
11It is not entirely clear from Appellants' Motion to Amend and the accompanying memoranda how
Appellants came up with a computation rate of "time and one-half (1/2)" in connection with their Article
XV1, Section 6, Utah Constitution, claim. The only reference the Board could fmd in the memoranda
supporting this compensation rate was at page 8 of Appellants 'Reply Memorandum in Further Support of
Motion to Amend Grievance dated August 20, 1999, wherein Appellants assert that such compensation would
be "in keeping with the development of modem law.... "
The Board notes that in Decision 1, the Hearing Officer addressed this issue pursuant to the motions
filed with him and held that it was "an unacceptable reach" for Appellants to rely on Article XVI, Section 6
of the Utah Constitution to support their claim for compensation at a rate of one and one-half (112) for all
times that they were "on-call". Careful review of Appellants' Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal indicates that
Appellants are not challenging this specific aspect ofDecision lin their appeal to this Board.
12ALJ

Robinson originally denied Appellants' Motion to Amend on November 3, 1999. However,
he allowed Appellants to file additional or supplemental memoranda for him to review in reconsideration
of his order. After reviewing the additional memoranda, ALJ Robins on issued his fmal order on February 7,
2000. Again, these documents are part of the file maintained by the CSRB.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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of the work day, Article XVI, Section 6, of the Utah Constitution, did not apply to Grievants'
requested remedy that they be "made whole for the lost 'on-call' compensation we [they] had not
received." (Id.)
On May 9, 2000, an evidentiary Level IV hearing concerning Appellants' grievance was held
before ALJ Robinson. This hearing was held as part of the Department's internal grievance
procedure and in consonance with the rules established by the CSRB at R13 7-1-15 and under the
authority of Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-28.
On May 22, 2000, ALJ Robinson entered his Report and Recommendation wherein he
recommended that Appellants be compensated for "on-call time" in accordance with DHRM rule
R477-8-6(8)(c)(i) which requires an employee to be compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of
1 hour for every 12 hours the employee is on call. 13 However, in his Report and Recommendation,
ALI Robinson specifically limited Appellants' recovery to "on-call pay for a period of20 days back

from the date they filed the grievance 14 and prospectively from the date of filing, if the evidence
shows they were 'on-call."' 15
As authorized in Department policy, 16 Appellants then requested that the executive director
for the Department review the ALI's Report and Recommendation.

(Agency Ex. 3) 17

On

January 19, 2001, Executive Director Mike Chabries (Exec. Dir. Chabries) entered his Final Order
accepting and adopting the findings and conclusions of ALJ Robinson. (Agency Ex. 4) Specifically,
Exec. Dir. Chabries decided that Appellants were in fact "on-call by virtue of being assigned a
commute vehicle, or, in Mr. Slocum's case, by virtue ofhis POST order." (Jd.) He then ordered that

13 F or the precise wording of the DHRMrule regarding "on-call" compensation atthe time Appellants

filed their grievance see footnote 4.
14In reaching this

decision, ALJ Robinson focused primarily on Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-40 1(5) and
the CSRB decision in Karber v. Utah Dep 't of Corrections, Case No.6 CSRB 57 addressing this statute.
15Report and Recommendation,

Agency Exhibit 3 ~~ 3, 5 at 4.

16In

accordance with departmental policy, either party may request a meeting with the Executive
Director to review the ALJ' s Report and Recommendation. This request must be done within five working
days upon receipt of the Report and Recommendation. If review of the Report and Recommendation is not
requested within the five working days of receipt, it becomes the fmal order for the Department.
17It

is clear from the documents on file with the CSRB that after ALJ Robinson entered his Report
and Recommendation, the parties attempted to mediate this matter. These attempts were unsuccessful and
on January 12, 2001, Mr. Dyer sent a facsimile to ALJ Robinson requesting that the matter be referred to the
Executive Director for a fmal order. (Agency Ex. 4)
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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Appellants be permitted to submit amended time sheets listing "on-call time" back 20 days from the
date they filed their grievance and then fonvard to include the time Appellants could establish they
were "on-call." (Id.) In reaching this decision, Exec. Dir. Chabries also limited the compensation
to be paid to Appellants for any "on-call time" to "1 hour's pay for every 12 hours they were 'oncall' during that time period." (Id.Y 8

In his Final Decision, Exec. Dir. Chabries also elected to not exercise discretion to go back
more than 20 working days from the date the grievance was filed in awarding this "on-call"
compensation. (Id.) 19 Finally, with respect to Appellants' motion to amend their grievance to include
claims under Article XVI, Section 6, Utah Constitution, Exec. Dir. Chabries concluded that"' on-call
time,' since it is not hours worked, is not part of the work day. Therefore, Article XVI, Section 6,
is not applicable." (ld.)
On February 5, 2001, Appellants timely filed their appeal of Exec. Dir. Chabries' Final
Order with the CSRB.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

In addressing the involved proceedings before the CSRB in connection with this matter, the
Board makes special note of the numerous motions and memoranda filed in this case. The
proceedings before the CSRB began when Appellants filed their appeal of the Department's Final
Order with the CSRB on February 5, 2001. Thereafter, on May 2, 2001, the Department filed its
Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine with accompanying memoranda of points and authority in

support of each with the CSRB. 20

In its motion, the Department moved to dismiss Appellants' grievance primarily on the basis
that pursuant to Exec. Dir. Chabries' Final Order, Appellants had been granted the remedy they

18Though Exec.

Dir. Chabries does not cite to any specific law or rule in making this determination,
it is evident that he is referring to DHRM rule R477-8-6(8)(c)(i) which was cited inALJRobinson's Report
and Recommendation which requires that an employee who is to be available for "on-call" work shall be
compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee is "on-call".
(Agency Ex. 3,, 9 at 4-5)
19As

discussed briefly at footnote 3 above, and more fully at pages 13-15 below, the Board, pursuant
to CSRB rule R13 7-1-22(4)(a), is correcting the factual findings in this case to find that Appellants filed their
grievance on January 30, 1998. Both ALJ Robinson and Exec. Dir. Mike Chabries found that Appellants
filed their grievance on February 11, 1998. (Agency Exs. 3, 4)
20 These motions and memoranda were filed

at the prehearing conference held on May 2, 2001, before

then Administrator Robert N. White.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65

Page6

000495

sought "to the full extent of the law." (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6) In
making this argument, the Department relied primarily on Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5) and
CSRB rule R137-1-2. 21

In its motion to dismiss, the Department essentially argued that absent excusable neglect, any
claim by Appellants for "on-call" compensation that extended beyond 20 working days from the date
the grievance was filed was "barred by the statute of limitations imposed on the filing of employee
grievances." (Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine and Motion to Dismiss at 4

(Reply for Motion to Dismiss)) The Department argued that since Appellants failed to meet the
requirements of "excusable neglect," it acted appropriately and lawfully in limiting Appellants'
recovery of "on-call" compensation to 20 working days from the date Appellants filed their
grievance. (Reply from Motion to Dismiss at 5)

In their opposition to the Departments motion to dismiss, Appellants argued that the 20-day
time limit for filing grievances under Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1(5) governs jurisdiction only and
does not limit "the scope of their remedy to twenty (20) days prior to the filing of their grievance."

(Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 7) Instead, Appellants argued that the scope of
their recovery should include "on-call time" for a period of four years preceding the date on which
they filed their grievance. 22
Appellants further argued that limiting their eligibility to recover "on-call" compensation to
the 20 days preceding the date they filed their grievance, violates the "open courts" provision of the

Utah Constitution. (!d. at 3 n.8) Finally, Appellants argued that the Department's conduct allegedly
designed to discourage Appellants from requesting "on-call" compensation bars them from asserting
that Appellants' grievance was "untimely filed." (!d.)
After considering the Department's motion and the memoranda in support and opposition

21 Utah

Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5) provides as follows:
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule,
an employee may submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee
submits the grievance:
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge ofthe event giving rise to the
grievance.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an employee may not submit a grievance more than
one year after the event giving rise to the grievance.
22 See

footnote 5 at page 3 above.

Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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thereto, the Hearing Officer entered his Decision 1 on October 12,2001. In this written decision,
the Hearing Officer upheld the Department's Final Order concluding that "Grievants have received
all on-call compensation to which they are entitled under the laws and rules applicable to their
grievance." (Decision 1 at 3)
Specifically addressing these laws, the Hearing Officer concluded that: "The time limitations
contained in §67-19a-401(5)(a), Utah Code, constitute a limit on the scope ofreliefthat can be
granted Grievants . . . The CSRB and its hearing officer do not have jurisdiction to consider
allegations of improper conduct or knowing violations of statute and policy that were not timely
grieved." (Id.)
On October 30, 2001, Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Utah

Administrative Code R137-1-21(12). On December 26, 2001, the Hearing Officer entered his
decision denying Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
On January 2, 2002, Appellants timely appealed the Hearing Officer's Decision 1 to the
Board. In their initial appeal to the Board, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's Decision 1
on two primary grounds. First, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in sustaining the
Department's Final Order limiting Appellants' compensation for "on-call time" to the 20 working
days preceding the filing of their grievance. (Appellants' Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 5) In
making this argument, Appellants essentially argue that limiting Appellants' relief to the 20 working
days preceding the filing of their grievance violates the Open Courts provision contained in the Utah

Constitution. (Id.at 5-6i3 In connection with this limitation of action argument, Appellants argue
alternatively that the Hearing Officer erred by not finding that the Department acted "arbitrarily and
capriciously" in not awarding Appellants' "on-call time" compensation back one year from the filing
oftheir grievance under Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5)(b). 24 (Jd.at 10-11)
Second, Appellants argue that because an evidentiary hearing was not held prior to the
Hearing Officer's Decision 1, his decision is more appropriately characterized as an "informal

23 At

page 6 of their Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal, Appellants specifically cite to Article I,
Section 11, of the Utah Constitution.
24

In their Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal, Appellants do not specifically cite to Utah Code Ann.

§ 67 -19a-40 1(5) in making this alternative argument. However, it appears clear from this argument and from

Appellants' reference to the Department's Report and Recommendation, that this is in fact the statute they
are relying upon for their alternative position that the Department should have awarded back pay for "oncall" compensation for at least one year preceding the date they filed their grievance.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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adjudicative proceeding," thereby allowing Appellants "to file a petition with the District Court for
a trial de novo from the Department's Step 6 decision in this matter." (Jd.at 13)25
On Wednesday, August 7, 2002, the Board completed its Step 6 review of Respondents'
initial appeal with a hearing involving all the parties and by meeting in an executive session. On
October 3, 2002, the Board issued its Order ofRemand in this case. This Order was made pursuant
to CSRB rule R13 7-1-22(7).

In its Order ofRemand, the Board specifically remanded this case to the Hearing Officer to
make an "evidentiary determination on the sole issue as to whether there was excusable neglect
allowing the Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning 'oncall time'." (Emphasis added) By its Order, the Board specifically left it to the discretion ofthe
Hearing Officer to determine whether there was excusable neglect sufficient to allow Grievants to
wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance. In addition, the Board left it to the
Hearing Officer to decide whether to obtain this evidence through affidavits, stipulated facts, or
sworn testimony. (Order ofRemand) On Thursday, December 5, 2002, the Hearing Officer held an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of "excusable neglect."
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. REMANDED EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND DECISION ON REMAND
As set forth above, an evidentiary hearing regarding "excusable neglect" was held on
Thursday, December 5, 2002. At the hearing, Appellants were represented by Phillip W. Dyer,
Attorney at Law. Appellants Harold W. Johnson, Daniel Leatham, Timothy Slocum and Robert
Steele were present at the evidentiary hearing. Appellant W. Fred Hurst was not present. The
Department was represented by Assistant Attorney General Patrick B. Nolan. Assisting Mr. Nolan
and acting as the Department's management representatives were David Salazar, Human Resource
Director for the Department, and Linda Whitney, Human Resource Manager for the Department.
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code

25As

directly quoted above from their Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal, Appellants refer to the
"Department's Step 6 Decision in this matter." The Board believes this to be a typographical error and that
in fact the Appellants are referring to the Hearing Officer's Step 5 decision rendered after motions and
accompanying memoranda were filed. In reaching this conclusion, the Board cites to Grievants' Initial
Step 6 Reply Briefwherein they reference CSRB rule R137-1-17 which specifically incorporates Utah Code
Ann.§ 67-19a-403(2)(b) and Utah Code Ann.§ 63-64b-4. CSRB rule R137-1-17(5) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-15 and 17 allow the State's District Courts to "review by trial de novo all fmal agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings .... "
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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Ann. § 67 -19a-406. Moreover, because Appellants are challenging the Department's denial of salary
authorized under State personnel rules, they have the burden of proving their case by substantial
evidence and the burden of going forward. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(b) and (c)) At the
remanded evidentiary hearing, the sole issue was whether there was excusable neglect allowing the
Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning "on-call time."

(Order ofRemand)
At this evidentiary hearing, testimony was heard and evidence received concerning the issue
of"excusable neglect." Specifically, there was testimony given and documentary evidence received
concerning the reasons why Appellants did not file their grievance concerning "on-call time" until
January or February 1998. In connection with this testimony, there was also testimony given and
documentary evidence received relating to Appellants' "on-call" status both at the time Appellants
filed their grievance and for many years preceding the date of that filing.
At the conclusion of this evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision After Remand (Decision 2) dated January 8, 2003. In
making this Step 5 decision, the Hearing Officer thoroughly examined the evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing and carefully considered the legal arguments raised by the parties.
After considering the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and examining the
relevant statutes and rules governing excusable neglect in the filing of employee grievances, the
Hearing Officer entered his Step 5 decision essentially concluding that Grievants had received all
the "on-call" compensation to which they were entitled under the statutes and rules applicable to
their Grievance. 26 In connection with this decision, the Hearing Officer specifically concluded that
"Grievants did not have excusable neglect under Utah Code § 67-19a-401(5)(a) and Utah

Administrative Code R13 7-1-13(3) for the late filing of their grievance." (Decision 2 at 6)
As in Decision 1, the Hearing Officer again concluded that "the CSRB and its Hearing

26In Decision

2, the Hearing Officer specifically found that "Grievants [Appellants] are entitled to

on-call compensation for any time they can prove by satisfactory evidence that they served on call beginning
at a point 20 working days prior to February 5, 1998, and continuing thereafter for as long as they were
required to be on call." (Jd.at 12) As stated previously, pursuant to CSRB rule R137-1-22(4)(a), the Board
is correcting this factual fmding to fmd that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 199 8. The Board
is, however, sustaining the Hearing Officer's ultimate legal conclusion upholding the Department's Final
Order that Appellants are entitled to "on-call" compensation only for the 20 working-day period prior to the
date they filed their grievance for those periods of time that they were in "on-call" status as defmed by
DHRM rule at the time they filed their grievance.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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Officer do not have jurisdiction to consider allegations of improper conduct or knowing violations
of statute and policy that were not timely grieved" and that the time "limitations contained in
§67-19a-40 1(5)(a), Utah Code, are jurisdictional and constitute a limit on the scope of relief that can
be granted to Grievants." (Decision 2 at 5-6) Finally, the Hearing Officer also concluded that the
time limitation contained in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(b) is jurisdictional and creates an
ultimate time limit on the scope of relief that can be granted by State agencies and the CSRB when
considering grievances. (Id. at 5, 12)27
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In their appeal to the Board of the Hearing Officer's Decision After Remand (Decision 2),
Appellants appropriately reassert the issues raised in their initial appeal of the Hearing Officer's

Decision 1. 28 Specifically, Appellants reassert that the Hearing Officer erred in sustaining the
Department's Final Order limiting Appellants' compensation for "on-call time" to the 20 working
days preceding the filing of their grievance. (Appellants' Initial Step 6 Brief on Appeal at 5)29 In
addition, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer's Decision 1 is an "informal adjudicative
proceeding" thereby mandating that Appellants file a petition with the District Court for a "trial de
novo" of the Hearing Officer's Decision 1. (Appellants' Initial Step 6 Briefon Appeal at 5, 10, 13)

In addition to these issues already before the Board, Appellants also now appeal several
aspects of the Hearing Officer's Decision 2. Specifically, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer

27In

Decision 2, the Hearing Officer set forth five conclusions of law relative to this case. At
Footnote 2 of Appellants' Reply BriefAfter Remand, Appellants object to all but one of these conclusions
of law as being "beyond the scope" of the issues to be addressed on remand. The Board notes, but does not
share Appellants' concerns on this issue. Careful review of the Hearing Officer's Conclusions ofLaw as set
forth in Decision 2 reveals that these conclusions are essentially restatements of the Hearing Officer's
Conclusions of Law as set forth in Decision I relating to the scope of relief to which Appellants are entitled
and were fully briefed and argued by the parties prior to the remanded hearing. Moreover, because they are
conclusions of law, the Board will review them giving no deference to the Hearing Officer's decision on
these legal issues. (Utah Administrative Code Rl37-l-22(4)(c))
28 Footnote

1 of Appellants' BriefAfter Remand provides as follows:

Pursuant to the CSRB 's Order of Remand dated October 3, 2002, and Order limiting
briefing issues dated July I, 2003, Grievants have limited this Step 6 Brief to the issues
raised by Decision2. However, the issues previously briefed by the parties are still properly
before the CSRB for final disposition.
29In

support of this argument, Appellants rely heavily on the Open Courts provision contained in
Article!, Section 11 ofthe Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-40I(5).
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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erred in concluding that Appellants did not have excusable neglect for the late filing of their
grievance and thus sustaining the Department's Final Decision limiting their recovery for "on-call
time" to the 20 working days prior to the date they filed their grievance.

In addition, Appellants assert that the Hearing Officer erred in deciding "issues oflaw" that
were not argued or briefed at the remand hearing. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 3)
Specifically, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in addressing the event giving rise to
Appellants' grievance and applying Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5)(b) in his analysis of this case.

(Jd. at 3-4, n.6)
Finally, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in '"revising' his prior finding of fact
regarding the filing date of the grievance." (ld. at 5-6) These issues will be addressed in the
remainder of this Decision and Final Agency Action.

C. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a)( c), (Supp. 2003), which reads as follows:
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional
factual fmdings.
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the
factual fmdings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer.
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined
according to the above provisions.

Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's
factual fmdings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact

Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies,
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the decisions of the
Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts
together with the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were
considered by the Hearing Officer.
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. GRIEVENCE FILING DATE
As set forth above, on May 22, 2000, the Department's ALJ entered his Report and
Recommendation concerning Appellants' grievance. Pursuant to this Report and Recommendation,

ALJ Robinson recommended to the Department's executive director, that Appellants be
compensated for "on-call time" in accordance with DHRM rule which, both then and now, requires
an employee to be compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee
is on call. (Agency Ex. 3) In making this recommendation, however, ALJ Robinson specifically
limited Appellants recovery to "on-call pay for a period of20 days back from the day they filed their
grievance and prospectively from the date of filing if the evidence shows they were 'on-call."'
(!d. at 6) In his Report and Recommendation, ALI Robinson specifically found that Appellants filed

their grievance "on or about February 11, 1998." (Jd.at l)
On January 19, 2001, Exec. Dir. Chabries issued his Final Order accepting and adopting the
findings and conclusions of ALJ Robinson. (Agency Ex. 4) Exec. Dir. Chabries then allowed
Appellants to amend their time sheets listing "on-call time" back 20 days from the date they filed
their grievance and then forward to include the time Appellants could establish they were "on-call."
(ld.) Though only specific as to Appellant Slocum, in his Final Order, Exec. Dir. Chabries

"accepted" February 11, 1998, as the date Appellants filed their grievance. (Id.)
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1( 5)(a) and the Department's Final Order allowing
Appellants to amend their time sheets listing "on-call time" back 20 days from the date they filed
their grievance, the Hearing Officer- in Decision 1 - concluded that Appellants had "received all
on-call compensation to which they are entitled under the laws and rules applicable to their
grievance." (Decision 1 at 3) In reaching this decision however, the Hearmg Officer specifically

Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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found that Appellants had filed their original grievance on January 30, 1998. 30 (Id. at 1)

In Decision 2, however, the Hearing Officer revised this finding of fact to find that: "The
Hearing Officer must conclude that the date a copy was received in the office of the CSRB,
February 5, 1998, is the proper date of the grievance." (Decision 2 at 12Y 1 After making this finding
of fact, the Hearing Officer then concluded that Appellants' recovery on their grievance was limited
by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(a) to a period of20 working days "prior to February 5, 1998,
and continuing thereafter as long as they were required to be on-call." (Id.)
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board is correcting the Hearing Officer's

Decision 2, finding of fact regarding when Appellants filed their initial grievance. The Board is
taking this action pursuant to CSRB R13 7 -1-22(4 )(a). In reaching this decision, the Board notes that
although the Board agrees with the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion that Utah Code Ann.

§ 67-19a-401(5) limits the scope of relief to which Appellants are entitled to the 20 working-day
period prior to the date they filed their grievance, it does not believe the evidentiary record supports
the Hearing Officer's Decision 2 fmding that Appellants filed their grievance on February 5, 1998.

In reaching this decision, the Board notes that the Department, in both its Motion to Dismiss
and Motion in Limine, states that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998. In addition,
in the Department's Initial Briefon Appeal dated June 14, 2002, the Department again acknowledges
that Appellant's filed their initial grievance on January 30, 1998.
Moreover, the grievance itself, is signed by Appellants on January 30, 1998. The file
maintained by the CSRB also establishes that the Department's Level III response is dated
February 6, 1998. Finally, the record clearly establishes that Appellants' grievance datedJanuary30,
1998, was received at the office of the CSRB on February 5, 1998. Based upon this evidence, the
Board concludes that the grievance was clearly filed with the Department prior to February 5, 1998.
30The Board notes that in its statement of facts set forth in its Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss, the Department asserts that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998. However, in
its Reply to Motion to Dismiss, the Department alternatively asserts that Appellants filed their grievance on
February 11, 1998. (Reply to Motion to Dismiss at 2) Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss is silent
relative to the issue of when Appellants filed their grievance, but importantly, does not object to any of the
Statements of Facts set forth in the Department's Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Dismiss, including
the Department's statement of fact that the Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998.
31 The

Hearing Officer reached this fmding notwithstanding assurances made at the evidentiary
hearing that he would not alter his original fmding of fact that January 30, 1998, was the date Appellants
filed their grievance. Specifically addressing this issue at the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer stated
" .. .I am going to stand on the original fmding of fact which I made of January 30, 1998." (Tr. at 24)
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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Based upon the foregoing, the Board is correcting the Hearing Officer's Decision 2, to fmd
that Appellants filed their initial grievance on January 30, 1998. This decision is supported by the
memoranda and briefs submitted in this case and is consistent with the Hearing Officer's fmding of
fact set forth in Decision 1. In reaching this decision, the Board also notes that despite Appellants'
challenge to this fmding, the Department presented no argument in it's Response BriefAfter Remand
to support the Hearing Officer's Decision 2 finding that Appellants filed their initial grievance on
February 5, 1998. Based upon these facts, the Board corrects the record to indicate that Appellants
filed their initial grievance on January 30, 1998.

B. TIME LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES
As set forth at footnote 21 above, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401 (5) provides as follows:
(5)( a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule,
an employee may submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee
submits the grievance:
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of the event giving rise to the
grievance.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (S)(a), an employee may not submit a grievance more than
one year after the event giving rise to the grievance.

In both Appellants' Opposition to the Department's Motion to Dismiss and their Initial Step 6
Brief on Appeal, Appellants argue that as a matter oflaw Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5) governs
only jurisdiction and does not limit the scope of recovery available to Appellants. Appellants
essentially argue that because Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1(5) does not limit the scope of recovery
available, they are entitled to recover "on-call" compensation for a period of four years preceding
the date they filed their grievance. (Tr. at 131 )32

In support of this argument, Appellants assert that the statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19a-401(5) regarding the time frames in which an employee may submit a grievance are
discretionary in nature and that by in enacting this statute, the Legislature "did not create a, per se
statute of limitations." (Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 6-7) In making this
argument, Appellants concluded that:

32 See

footnote 5 above.
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While U.C.A. § 67-19a-401(5) may effectively operate to preclude the CSRB from
exercising jurisdiction in some circumstances, the Legislature did not impose a blanket
prohibition on the filing of a grievance because of the obvious potential for the same to be
held an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts.

(Id. at 7)

In Decision I, the Hearing Officer granted the Department's motions. In his Decision I, the
Hearing Officer agreed with the Department that the time limitations contained in Utah Code Ann.
§ 67 -19a-40 1( 5)(a) are jurisdictional and specifically limit the scope ofrelief available to Appellants
to the 20-day period prior to the date they filed their grievance. (Decision I at 6) Based upon this
legal conclusion and the Department's Final Order permitting Appellants to submit amended time
sheets listing their "on-call time" for the 20 working-day period prior to the date they filed their
grievance, the Hearing Officer held that "Grievants [Appellants] had received all on-call
compensation to which they are entitled under the laws and rules applicable to their grievance."

(ld. at 3)
In their appeal to this Board, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion that
Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1( 5) limits the scope of relief available to Appellants to the 20 working
days preceding the filing of their grievance. (Appellants' Initial Briefon Appeal at 5) Specifically
addressing this issue, Appellants argue that ''the Hearing Officer has unconstitutionally applied the
twenty (20) day 'statute of limitations' to Grievants because such statute is unreasonable and
therefore, unconstitutional ... "and that such a fmding "results in an unconstitutional application
of the Open Court's clause" of the Utah Constitution. (Initial Brief on Appeal at 7; citing Berry v.
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985)).
After carefully reviewing the Hearing Officer's decisions in this matter and considering the
parties' arguments, the Board upholds and thus sustains the Hearing Officer's decisions on this issue.

In reaching this decision, the Board finds that Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1(5) clearly establishes
mandatory time frames regarding when an employee may submit a grievance under the State's
Grievance and Appeal Procedures codified at Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-101 et seq.
This statute plainly requires that, absent excusable neglect, an employee must submit their
grievance for review either within 20 working days of the event giving rise to the grievance or within
20 working days after the employee has knowledge of the event giving rise to the grievance. (Utah
Code Ann. § 67-19a-40 1(5)(a)) (Emphasis added) Moreover, this section further jurisdictionally bars
consideration of any grievable event occurring "more than one year after the event giving rise to the
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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grievance." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(b)) (Emphasis added)
The Board finds that the language of this statute allows for no discretion as to when an
employee may submit their grievance. These limitation periods are mandatory and jurisdictionally
bar consideration of any grievences not filed within the specified time frames. 33

In addition, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decisions that absent excusable neglect,
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5), limit the scope of relief that can be granted to
a grievant to the 20 working-day period immediately preceding the date the grievance is filed. In
reaching this decision, the Board relies on the plain language of the statute and its prior decision in

Karber v. Utah Dep 't of Corrections, 6 CSRB 57 (1997).
In Karber, the Board considered the scope ofrelief available to an employee seeking recovery
of"excess hours" for a period oftime extending back approximately one and one-half years. In its
decision in Karber, this Board ruled that the scope of relief available to Karber was limited to the
20-day period immediately prior to the date he filed his grievance. The Board further reasoned that

Karber's grievance was untimely filed as to any period of time predating that 20-day period. (Id.at
9, 13)
By this decision, the Board reaffirms and upholds its prior decision in Karber. Both the
department and the CSRB are limited in the scope of relief they can grant to the 20-day time period
immediately preceding the date a grievance is filed. In interpreting the statute in this way, the Board
is treating Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1(5) no different from other statutes of limitation. As with
all limitations on action, an aggrieved individual may either comply with the time limits imposed
by the statute and thus secure the opportunity for redress, or ignore the time limitations and be
precluded from any available remedy. The Board simply has no jurisdiction over grievable events
that are not timely grieved.
C. fHE EVENT GIVING RISE TO THE GRIEVANCE

In the instant case, there is little factual dispute that Appellants were in "on-call" status, and
thus entitled to "on-call" compensation as allowed by DHRM rule R477-8-6(c)(i)/ 4 on numerous

33For

a discussion regarding this ruling and the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution, see
page 27 below.
34 As

set forth in footnote 4 above, this rule requires that employees in "on-call" status be
compensated for "on-call time" at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee is "on-call." The Board
recognizes that this Rule has been amended since Appellants filed their grievance. For the precise wording
of this Rule at the time Appellants filed their Grievance, see footnote 4 above.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65

Page 17

000506

occasions and for many years prior to the date they filed their grievance. (Decision 2 at 8 and at

8 n.l; Tr. at 129, 153; Agency Ex. 3at 2; Memorandum in Support of Motion to

Dismiss~~

6-9

at 3-4)35 Indeed, Appellant Leatham testified that he had a cell phone and a commute vehicle
beginning in either 1987 or 1988. (Tr. at 129) He further testified that he had a pager for a longer
period of time than that. (Id.) Likewise, Appellant Steele testified that he had been assigned a
commute vehicle and was required to carry a cell phone and a pager for approximately 20 years. (!d.
at 153)36
Taking all these factors into considerations, the Board concludes that a new grievable event
occurred in this case each time the State failed to pay Appellants any "on-call" compensation to
which they were entitled. Precisely for this reason, the Board does not believe that any singular
"event" gave rise to the Appellant's grievance in this case. Instead, the Board finds, similar to its
decision in Karber, that each separate pay day in which Appellants were entitled to "on-call"
compensation, but did not receive it, became a new grievable "event" subject to a new 20-day
grievance period under Utah Code Ann. § 69-19a-401(5).
In the instant case, this Board has already corrected the Hearing Officer's factual
determination to find that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30, 1998. 37 Therefore, absent
excusable neglect, this Board is jurisdictionally limited to the relief it can grant to the 20 workingday period immediately preceding the date Appellants filed their grievance. By so fmding, the Board
affirms that it does not have jurisdiction over grievable events that are not timely grieved under the
State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures.

D. EXCUSABLE NEGLECT

35 As

the Hearing Officer correctly found, Appellants seek a remedy going back four years from the
date they filed their grievance which would relate their grievance back to January 1994. (Tr. at 131) The
facts of this case establish that Appellants were in "on-call" status for at least the four years prior to filing
their grievance.
36 Mr.

Johnson testified similarly, but did not specifically mention what year he was assigned a
commute vehicle or when he was first required to carry a pager and cell phone. (Jd. at 146) Appellant
Slocum turned in his commute vehicle in February 1996, but was in "on-call" status after that pursuant to
his POST order requiring him to "carry a pager and respond to service upon activation during day or night."
(Agency Ex. 3 ~ 8 at 2)
thoroughly addressed above, the Board notes that nowhere in either their Initial Step 6
Brief on Appeal or their Brief on Appeal After Remand do Appellants argue for an earlier grievance filing
date than January 30, 1998.
37Though
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Having already determined that the "event" giving rise to Appellants' grievance occurred
each pay period the Department failed to pay "on-call" compensation to which Appellants were
entitled, the Board must now determine whether Appellants' neglect in waiting until January 30,
1998, to file their grievance is "excusable." Before addressing Appellants' actions in waiting until
January 30, 1998, to file their grievance, the Board will first briefly address Utah Code Ann.

§ 67-19a-401(5)(b) that provides:

"Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a) [excusable neglect], an

employee may not submit a grievance more than one year after the even giving rise to the grievance."
As stated previously, one of the Board's obligations on appeal is to review the hearing
officer's decision to determine whether relevant policies, rules and statutes were correctly applied.

In making this legal determination, the Board gives no deference to the hearing officer's decision.
(CSRB rule R137-1-22(4)(b)) In his Decision 2, the Hearing Officer specifically found that Utah

Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5)(b) jurisdictionally bars both the Department and the CSRB from
considering an employee grievance submitted more that one year after the "event giving rise to the
grievance," even in situations where excusable neglect is an issue. (Id.at 6) The Board agrees with
the Hearing Officer's decision on this issue.
Moreover, the Board does not find, as Appellants argue, that the Hearing Officer's ruling
on this issue in Decision 2 went beyond the scope of the issue remanded to him. 38 The Board's

Order ofRemand dated October 3, 2002, ordered that an evidentiary determination be made by the
Hearing Officer "as to whether there is excusable neglect allowing Grievants to wait until January
or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning on-call time." (Emphasis added) 39

In making his legal conclusion concerning excusable neglect, the Hearing Officer was simply
emphasizing that even if he "found that Grievants had excusable neglect for the delay in filing their
grievance," such neglect would not allow the filing of their grievance more than one year from the

Regardingthis legal issue, Appellants argue: "In Decision 2, the H.O. spends much time addressing
the following issues: ... 2) does any grievant's excusable neglect toll the one (1) year statute of
limitation/repose contained in U.C.A. 67-19[a]-401(5)(b) (1999)? Obviously, Grievants' counsel was not
given advance notice by the H.O. that he believed ... the foregoing issues were encompassed within the
CSRB's Remand Order." (Brief on Appeal After Remand at 3-4, n.6)
38

their appeal to this Board, Appellants maintain that because an evidentiary hearing was not held
prior to the Hearing Officer's Decision 1, his decision should have been characterized as an "informal
adjudicative proceeding" allowing Appellants to "file a petition with the District Court for a trial de
novo .... " Based upon the remanded evidentiary hearing held in this matter on December 5, 2002, the Board
now considers this argument moot.
39In
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date of the "event" giving rise to their grievance. (Decision 2 at 6)
The Board finds no error by the Hearing Officer in addressing this legal issue in Decision 2
and upholds his legal conclusion on this matter. Specifically, the Board fmds that the statute setting
forth the time frames in which an employee may submit a grievance are mandatory and under no
circumstances may a grievance be submitted more that one year after the "event" giving rise to the
grievance. Based upon this statute, the Board finds that both the Board and its hearing officers are
jurisdictionally limited in the scope ofreliefthey can grant by Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5).
Having thoroughly addressed the jurisdictional limitations cabined in Utah Code Ann.

§ 67-19a-401(5), the Board will now address excusable neglect as it specifically relates to
Appellants' case. After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, the Board notes that
Appellants have essentially advanced two discordant reasons for waiting until January 30, 1998, to
file their grievance. 40
First, Appellants assert that they were not aware of their entitlement to "on-call"
compensation until January 1998.

(Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,

~6

at 5) In

connection with this argument, Appellants argue that they were mislead by the Department regarding
their entitlement to "on-call" compensation and filed their grievance shortly after concluding that
theywereinfactentitledto such compensation. (!d.; Tr. at 115,117,127,132-133,140,150, 157;

Decision 2

~

20 at 5)

Conversely, Appellants assert that they had a reasonable fear ofretaliation by the Department
that prevented them from filing their grievance in a timely manner. Appellants argue that this fear
was ongoing creating a legal basis for waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance.
(Tr. 121-122,141-144, 159-162; Appellants' Briefon Appeal After Remand at 14-21; Opposition to

Motion to Dismiss at 8)

40 The

Board finds troubling the inherent inconsistency of the reasons advanced by Appellants for
waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. This concern is based primarily on the Board's view
that Appellants cannot simultaneously assert "they were not aware they could claim on-call time until shortly
before they filed the grievance" and simultaneously argue that, but for their fear of retaliation by the
Department, they would have filed their grievance sooner. (Compare Appellants' Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss at ~6 at 5 and Appellants' Briefon Appeal After Remand at 22 withAppellants 'Briefon Appeal After
Remand at 13-20) The Board fmds these inconsistencies to exist even if- as Appellants claim- they were
misled by the Department regarding their entitlement to such compensation. Lack of knowledge, regardless
of the reason, is simply inconsistent with their argument that absent fear of retaliation they would have filed
their grievance sooner. This later argument necessarily embodies knowledge of their entitlement to such
compensation.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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Prior to addressing these specific reasons advanced by Appellants for waiting until
January 30, 1998, to file their grievance, the Board will briefly address the statutes and rules
regarding "excusable neglect." The Board notes in its review of the statutes and rules concerning
"excusable neglect," that the specific statute setting forth the time frames in which an employee must
file a grievance does not defme the term "excusable neglect." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5))
Indeed, the specific language of this statute states that: "Unless the employee meets the requirements
of excusable neglect established by rule ... " (Emphasis added) Based upon the plain language of
this statute, it is clear that the Legislature gave to the CSRB the authority to promulgate rules
defming "excusable neglect." (Id.)
CSRB rules regarding "excusable neglect" provide that:
"Excusable Neglect" means the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably
prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper steps at the proper
time, not in consequence of the person's own carelessness, inattention, or
willful disregard in the processing of a grievance, but in consequence of
some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident.

(CSRB rule Rl37-1-2)
The only other rule touching upon "excusable neglect" can be found at CSRB rule
R137-l-13(3)(a) which provides as follows:
(a)

the administrator or appointed CSRB hearing officer shall
determine the applicability of the excusable neglect standard on the
basis of good cause.

Using our rules as the foundation, the Board will now consider whether the reasons advanced
by Appellants for waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance constitute "excusable
neglect." Before doing so however, the Board notes its agreement with the Hearing Officer that
"excusable neglect cases are 'highly fact intensive.'" (Citing West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337
(Utah 1997))

Moreover, the Board notes that factfinders are given broad discretion in making

excusable neglect determinations. (Jd.) The Board also agrees with the Hearing Officer concerning
the scope and applicability of the Board's defmition of "excusable neglect." This definition
incorporates the provisions of CSRB rule Rl3 7-1-13 (3 )(a) in that "excusable neglect" contemplates
an "unexpected or unavoidable hindrance" for not filing a grievance timely. The Board believes an
unexpected or unavoidable hindrance normally involves circumstances that are essentially beyond
a person's control which equates to "good cause." See Riesbeckv. HCA Health Services of Utah 2
P.3d 447 (Utah 2000)
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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Addressing first Appellants's contention that they "were not aware of their entitlement to
on-call compensation pursuant to DHRM rule R477-8-6(a)(c)(i) until January of 1998," the Board
notes its agreement with the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Appellants "lack of awareness oftheir
legal rights vis-a-vis the on-call time is not the same as lack of knowledge of the on-call time itself."
(Decision 1 at 8) As previously discussed, Appellants knew they were in "on-call" status for at least
four years prior to the filing of their grievance. (Decision 2 at 8, 8 n.l; Tr. at 129, 146, 153; Agency
Ex. 3 ~~ 8-9 at 2) Appellants also knew that they were not being compensated for being in "on-call"
status.
Addressing the issue of what triggers the running of a period oflimitations, the Utah Court
of Appeals held in Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) that it is
the event, not the discovery of a legal theory on which one may make a claim, that triggers the
running of a period of limitations. (Jd.at 576) In the instant case, the event triggering the running
of the limitation period occurred each separate pay period in which Appellants' were entitled to "oncall" compensation, but did not receive it. Appellants alleged lack of knowledge concerning their
entitlement to "on-call" compensation under DHRM rule simply does not stop the running of the
limitation periods set forth in Utah Code Ann. §67-19a-401(5).

This statute clearly and

unambiguously requires that absent excusable neglect, employees must file their grievance within
I

20 working days of the "event" giving rise to the grievance or within 20 working days after the
employee has knowledge of such "event."
The Board reaches this decision while recognizing that Appellants assert that the Department
engaged in misleading conduct allegedly impairing Appellants' ability to ascertain their entitlement
to "on-call" compensation while in "on-call" status. In support of this argument, Appellants rely
primarily on the fact that, prior to July 1997, the Department told Appellants not to submit time
sheets because they were exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and thus
not entitled to any compensation beyond their regular salary. (Tr. at 136; Agency Ex. 3 ~ 2 at 1;
Appellants' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at ~ 1 at 4; Appellants' Reply BriefAfter Remand at 6
n.8) Appellants further argue that this "misleading conduct" continued even after July 1997, when
the Department "all of a sudden" switched their position and had Appellants fill out time sheets, but
limited the compensation Appellants received for being in "on-call" status to those times that they
were the Officer in Charge (OIC). (Tr. 130, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
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The Board does not believe these factors are sufficient to constitute an unavoidable hindrance
allowing Appellants to wait until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. In support of this
position, the Board notes that the DHRM rule regarding "on-call" compensation was readily
available, not only to Appellants, but to all public employees at all times relevant to this matter.
Moreover, it is undisputed that in July 1997, when the new Executive Director for the Department
took over, Appellants were again required to submit time sheets and began receiving "on-call"
compensation for those periods of time they were "on-call" as the OIC. (Tr. at 130, 136; Agency
Ex. 3 ~ 2 at 1; Appellants Reply BriefAfter Remand at 6-7)

In the instant case, the Board simply does not find, to the extent that Appellants argue such,
that their lack of knowledge of entitlement to "on-call" compensation constitutes excusable neglect
enabling them to wait until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. As stated previously regarding
this issue, lack of knowledge of an "event" tolls the limitation periods for filing grievances; failure
to recognize that an "event" is grievable does not. Based upon the foregoing, the Board upholds the
Hearing Officer's decisions on this issue.
Appellants second contention for waiting untilJanuary 30, 1998, to file their grievance is that
their fear of retaliation by the Department prevented them from filing their grievance in a more
timely manner and that this fear was sufficient to constitute "excusable neglect" under CSRB rules.
(Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 14-20) After conducting an evidentiary hearing on

the remanded issue of "excusable neglect," the Hearing Officer issued his Decision 2 on January 8,
2003. In this decision, the Hearing Officer examined whether the Appellants' alleged fear of
retaliation for filing a grievance was sufficient to constitute "excusable neglect" under CSRB rules.
Specifically addressing this issue, the Hearing Officer concluded that Appellants' "fear of
retaliation prior to July 1997, was sufficient on the facts of this case to constitute unavoidable
hindrance, and imbued Grievants failure to file a timely grievance with excusable neglect for
purposes of§ 67-19[a]-401(5)(a). (Decision 2 at 10) However, in reaching this decision, the
Hearing Officer specifically limited his fmding of "excusable neglect" to the time period prior to
July 1997, when Mr. Pete Haun (Exec. Dir. Haun) became the executive director of the Department.

In reaching his decision that Appellants lacked "excusable neglect" after July 1997, the

41 See

footnote 30 at 14 above.
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Hearing Officer in his Decision 2 focused on the significant efforts made by Exec. Dir. Haun to
create an atmosphere where employees of the Department would feel free to file grievances and deal
with concerns in an environment free of retaliation or reprisal. The efforts emphasized by the
Hearing Officer included Exec. Dir. Haun's numerous visits to the Department's facilities and his
use of the Department's in-house newsletter to let employees know ofhis desire to improve working
conditions within the agency and specifically let employees know that there would be no retaliation
for filing grievances.

In specific relation to Appellants, the Hearing Officer focused on

Exec. Dir. Haun' s request that Appellants and others submit time sheets for the hours they worked
and starting in July 1997 compensated Appellants for the period of time they were in "on-call" status
as OICs. (Decision 2 , 11 at 4, 10-11)

In reviewing the Hearing Officer's decision on this issue, the Board must first determine
whether the Hearing Officer's factual fmdings are supported by the evidentiary record. (Utah Admin.

Code R137-1-22(4)(a)) In making such a determination, this Board has consistently held that the
findings of the fact finder are entitled to a presumption of correctness. (Jones v. Utah Dep 't of

Public Safety, 4 CSRB 38 (Step 6) (1992); See also Pace v. Utah Dep't ofPublic Safety, 7 CSRB
64 at 15-16 (Step6) (2002); Parks and Recreation v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at 7-8 (1986).)

In the instant case, the Hearing Officer heard testimony from Appellants Leatham, Johnson,
Steele and Slocum. He also heard testimony from then Exec. Dir. Haun, ALJ R. Spencer Robinson
and others. The Hearing Officer was in the best position to hear this testimony, weigh the evidence
given, and judge the veracity of the witnesses' statements. At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing in this matter, the Hearing Officer entered his final decision concluding that Appellants did
not have "excusable neglect" to wait until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance. In reaching this
decision, the Hearing Officer essentially concluded that Appellants' alleged fear of retaliation after
July 1997 was not reasonable and that there was an "inherent inconsistency" in Appellants claim that
they "continued to fear possible retaliation after July 1997, while simultaneously reporting on-call
time for which they were compensated." (Id.at 1lt2

42 The

Board does not agree with Appellants that "it [the Board] is in as good a position as the
Hearing Officer to determine the challenged fmding of fact based on the transcript and exhibits," or that it
"should review the fmding of fact ne novo." (Appellants' Brief on Appeal After Remand at 9) Careful
review of his decision clearly indicates that the Hearing Officer considered all the evidence and weighed the
credibility of the witnesses before entering his decision. Indeed, the Hearing Officer specifically references
the conflicting testimony which Appellants assert he did not address in his Decision 2. (Decision 2 at 10-12)
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record, including the sworn testimony of the
witnesses and the documents entered into evidence, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's
conclusion that Appellants did not have "excusable neglect," based upon concerns of retaliation, for
waiting until January 30, 1998, to file their grievance.

In reaching this decision, the Board cites to the evidentiary record which establishes that
immediateIy after taking office, Exec. Dir. Haun visited every region and every departmental facility
and spoke with "hundreds and hundreds" of the Department's employees informing them of his
open-door policy and his desire to improve working conditions within the Department. (Tr. at 174,
181, 205) In connection with these meetings, Exec. Dir. Haun emphasized that employees should
feel free to file grievances and deal with employment concerns in an environment free of retaliation
or reprisal and that his intent was to do a complete revision of the staff discipline and grievance
procedures including a recision of the general order prohibiting the ALJ from hearing employee
grievances. (Tr. at 183; Agency Ex. 3 ~15 at 3, Agency Ex. 5;Appellants' Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss~ 5 at 5)

The evidence also establishes that Exec. Dir. Haun used the Department's in-house

newsletter to inform employees of his intent to revise the Department's discipline and grievance
procedure and even requested input from the employees on such revisions. (Tr. at 175, 182; Agency
Ex. 5)
The record also establishes that after Mr. Haun because Executive Director for the
Department in July 1997, Appellants began submitting time sheets and were compensated variously
for the time they were in "on-call'' status as OICs. (Agency Ex. 3 ~2 at 1; Memorandum in Support

ofMotion to Dismiss~ 2 at 2, Appellants' Reply BriefAfter Remand at 6)43 Moreover, the facts of
this case establish that shortly after Mr. Haun became Executive Director of the Department,
Appellant Leatham met with him to discuss individual issues unrelated to this grievance. (Tr. at 123,
132-133) Indeed, when testifying concerning his initial meeting with then Exec. Dir. Haun,
Appellant Leatham specifically testified that if he had known he was eligible for "on-call"
compensation, he would have brought it up with Exec. Dir. Haun during this initial meeting. (Jd.
at 132-133)

43 Agency Exhibit

3, which was admitted into evidence without objection and as part of the record,
establishes that beginning with pay period 13 of 1997, Appellants' Leatham and Steele submitted time sheets
listing "on-call" hours. Appellants' Johnson and Hearst began submitting time sheets in pay period 14 of
1997. The hearing transcript on page 158 indicates that Appellant Slocum first submitted his time sheet
listing "on-call" hours in December of 1997. These facts are not disputed anywhere in the evidentiary record.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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Based upon these factors, the Board fmds that in reaching his conclusion that after Mr. Haun
became Executive Director, Appellants did not have "excusable neglect" to wait until January 30,
1998, to file their grievance, the Hearing Officer did not abuse the broad discretion granted to him
to make this determination. His decision is reasonable and rational and supported by the evidentiary
record. Moreover, the Hearing Officer clearly weighed and considered the conflicting evidence
before reaching his decision. (Decision 2 at 10-12) For these reasons the Board sustains the Hearing
Officer's finding that Appellants lacked "excusable neglect" based on fear of retaliation after

Mr. Haun became executive director of the Department. 44
As the Board has determined that Appellants lacked "excusable neglect" for filing their
grievance more than six months after Mr. Haun became the Executive Director of the Department,
it is not necessary for it to reach the Hearing Officer's decision that Appellants met the standard for
"excusable neglect" prior to July 1997. (See Decision 2 at 12t5 Even assuming, however,
Appellants' fear of retaliation under the previous administration would bring them within the
definition of" excusable neglect," the Board finds those fears reasonably should have dissipated after

Mr. Haun became Executive Director. The Board reaches this decision in light of the evidentiary
record cited above establishing the significant efforts made by Exec. Dir. Haun to create an
atmosphere where employees could feel free to file grievances without fear of retaliation or reprisal
and the fact that Appellants filed their grievance more than six months after Mr. Haun became the
Executive Director.
The Utah Legislature, in creating a forum for employees to seek redress from problems
connected with their employment, set specific and unambiguous limits on the time frames in which
a grievance can be filed and the relief that can be granted. These limitations are set forth at Utah

Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5).

44 To

the extent that the Hearing Officer's decision can be read to find that had Appellants filed their
grievance before July 1997, they would have been entitled to four years of"on-call" compensation, the Board
is modifying that decision pursuant to CSRB rule R137-1-22(4)(b) and (8)(c). As stated previously, an
employee may never submit a grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance.
(Utah Code Ann.§ 67-19a-401(5)(b)) Based upon this law, even assuming the actions of the previous
administration would bring Appellants' failure to file within the defmition of"excusable neglect," the scope
of their remedy would not extend beyond one year from the date Appellants filed their grievance.
45 Though

they never appealed this fmding, in their Response BriefAfter Remand, the Department
expresses concerns with this conclusion stating that: "Though the Agency questions certain legal aspects
of his opinion as addressed below, the end result of his decision is legally correct." (Id. at 13-14)
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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In addition, the Legislature also enacted prohibitions concerning reprisals against career
service employees for use of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. Cabined in all these
statutory provisions, the Board fmds a Legislative process designed to promote a fair, thorough and
expeditious means to resolve concerns related to public employment. (See generally Taylor v. Utah

State Training School775 P.2d 432) (Utah Ct. App.) (1989))
This process specifically contemplates that employees be able file grievances free of fear of
retaliation or reprisal. At the same time, however, this process also does not permit employees to
sit on their rights and deprive State agencies or the CSRB of the ability to address or rectify
employee concerns or management mistakes at the earliest possible date. Failure to adhere to either
of these mandates runs afoul of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act.

In reaching our decision herein, the Board notes that the statutory framework set forth in the
State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act can only protect an employee from actual retaliation
not from fear, whether real or supposed, of such retaliation. By failing to file their grievance when
the "event" occurred, Appellants essentially stripped the CSRB or its Hearing Officer of the ability
to protect them against actual retaliation. The Board cannot allow this conduct any more than it
could allow retaliation or reprisal against an employee exercising his or her right by submitting a
grievance. This Board feels that any other ruling by it in the instant case would only foster what the
statute explicitly prohibits. For this reason, the Board fmds as a matter oflaw, that fear of retaliation
in and of itself, is insufficient to establish "excusable neglect" under our rules. 46
Finally, the Board does not believe that the Hearing Officer's decision violates the Open
Courts provision of the Utah Constitution as applied to Appellants. 47 In reaching this decision, the
Board reiterates that the 20-day limitation on employee grievances has been a threshold requirement
of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures for many years. As stated by the Hearing Officer:

46Because

the Board agrees with the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Appellants did not have
"excusable neglect" for filing their grievance more than six months after Mr. Haun became the Executive
Director of the Department, it is unnecessary for it to examine the Hearing Officer's conclusion that
Appellants had "excusable neglect" prior to Mr. Haun becoming the Executive Director of the Department.
However, to the extent that our decision herein modifies the Hearing Officer's conclusion relative to
"excusable neglect" prior to 1997, the Board does so pursuant to CSRB rule Rl37-1-22(4)(b) and -(8)(c).
47 The

Board recognizes the Article VITI, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution reserves solely to the
Utah Supreme Court the authority to declare any law unconstitutional. Based upon this fact, the Board is
extremely hesitant to address this issue and will do so only to the extent that this provision applies to
Appellants.
Hurst, Johnson, Leatham, Slocum and Steele v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 65
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The underlying tenant [sic] of the grievance system and the time limits
imposed on the filing of grievances is to encourage grievances at the point
of a "grievable event" in order to allow the State to resolve those
grievances at the earliest possible time. See Taylor v. Utah State Training
School, 775 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1989). When a grievable event occurs,
such as a denial of on-call pay to which an employee is otherwise entitled,
the employee is obligated to file a timely grievance or lose his/her right to
grieve. This limitation is not a violation of the "open courts" provision of
the Utah Constitution. Indeed State employees have a remedy with ultimate
court review, provided they follow the rules applicable to that remedy....

(Decision on Grievants' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Decision on Agency's
Motion to Dismiss at 3 (Reconsideration Decision))
In the instant case, the facts establish that Appellants filed their grievance on January 30,
1998. As a result of this grievance, Appellants were permitted to submit amended time sheets listing
"on-call time" back 20 days from the date they filed their grievance and the forward to include the
time Appellants could establish they were "on-call." (Agency Ex. 4) It is clear that Appellants were
heard on their grievance and were granted a recovery, albeit less than they sought. As with all
limitations on action, an individual may either comply with the time limits imposed and secure his
claims or ignore those limitations and be precluded from any available remedy. In the instant case,
the Hearing Officer found no violation of the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution.

(Decision I at 5) Appellants' arguments have failed to persuade us otherwise. The Hearing
Officer's decision on this issue is thus sustained.

DECISION
After careful review of the entire evidentiary record, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's
decision that Appellants are entitled to "on-call" compensation for any time that they were in
"on-call" status beginning at a point 20 working days prior to the date they filed their grievance and
continuing thereafter for as long as they were required to be on-call. The Board hereby corrects the
Hearing Officer to find that Appellants filed their grievance on January 3 0, 199 8. The Board further
upholds the Hearing Officer's decision that Utah Code Ann. § 67 -19a-40 1( 5) jurisdictionally limits
the scope of relief that can be granted to the 20 working-day period immediately preceding the date
a grievance is filed and that the CSRB does not have jurisdiction over grievable events that are not
timely grieved under the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. Finally, the Board fmds the
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Hearing Officer's conclusion that Appellants did not have "excusable neglect" to wait until
January 30, 1998, to file their grievance to be both reasonable and rational and supported by the
evidentiary record.

DATED this 14th day of April2004.

DECISION UNANIMOUS
Blake S. Atkin, Chair
Joan M. Gallegos, Member
Felix J. McGowan, Member

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, Rl37-1-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
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Exhibit B

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

W. FRED HURST, DAN LEATHAM,
ROBERT E. STEELE, TIM SLOCUM,
and HAROLD W. JOHNSON,

FINDINGS OFFACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECISION
AFTER REMAND

Grievants,

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

Case No. 19 CSRB/H.O. 273
Hearing Officer: K. Allan Zabel

On_ May 2, 2001, the Department of Corrections (Agency), by and through its attorney of
record, Daryl L. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion in Limine.
Both motions were accompanied by supporting memoranda. On June 25,2001, Grievants, by and
through their attorney of record, Phillip W. Dyer, filed a memorandum in response to the Agency's
motions and memoranda. On July 31, 2001, Mr. Bell filed a reply memorandum. Neither party
requested oral argument. On October 12, 2001, the Hearing Officer issued his decision granting the
Agency's motions. Grievants appealed the Step 5 decision to the Career Service Review Board (Step
6). After briefing by the parties and oral argument, the Board remanded the case to the Step 5
Hearing Officer "to make an evidentiary determination on the sole issue as to whether there was
excusable neglect allowing Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance
concerning on-call time."
A hearing was held on December 5, 2002, to take evidence as to the issue of excusable
neglect. Patrick Nolan, Assistant Attorney General, was present as counsel for the Agency.
David Salazar, Human Resource Director, and Linda Whitney, Human Resource Manager, were
present as management representatives for the Agency. Phillip Dyer was present as counsel for
Grievants. Grievants Harold W. Johnson, Daniel Leatham, Timothy Slocum and Robert E. Steele,
were present. Grievant W. Fred Hurst was not present. A certified court reporter made a verbatim
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evidence were received into the record.

AUTHORITY
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to consider this matter is found
at Utah Code, §67-19a-202 (2000), and Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-1 et seq. (2000). The
authority of the CSRB to remand this case to the Step 5 Hearing Officer, and for the Hearing Officer
to consider the matter on remand, is found at Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-22(7).
Having heard and reviewed the evidence of record and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, the Hearing Officer [Presiding Officer, Utah Code, Subsection 63-46b-2(1)(h) (2000)],
now makes and enters the following Statement of the Issues, Supplemental Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue to be considered on remand is whether there was excusable neglect allowing
Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file their grievance concerning entitlement to
compensation for on-call time.

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
NOTE: The Findings ofF act contained in the Hearing Officer's decision issued October 12,
2001, are herewith supplemented by the following Findings.

I. Grievants were entitled to compensation for on-call time during the period of time when
they were required to carry pagers during off-duty hours, and when they were assigned commute
vehicles. Grievant Slocum had a commute vehicle until February 1996. Thereafter, Grievant
Slocum continued to be on call by reason of a Post Order. Grievants Leatham, Steele, Johnson and
Hurst were on call by virtue of the requirement to carry pagers and the assignment of commute
vehicles. These four Grievants had commute vehicles from 1994 to January 1998.
2. Since 1990 the Agency has had 4 Executive Directors." Their terms of office were as
follows:
Name
Gary DeLand
Lane McCotter
Pete Haun
Mike Chabries

Term of Office
From
To
1/4/92
1/4/92
7/11/97
7/23/97
1/2/01
1/6/01
Present
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transferred either arbitrarily or as retaliation for filing grievances or complaints.
4. Prior to 1992, there was an occasion when an employee identified as Mr. Lund was
ordered by the Executive Director to delete unfavorable information from a report about an employee
who was under investigation at the time. The employee refused to obey the order, and ended up
resigning from the Agency.
5. On one occasion prior to July 7, 1997, the Agency Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
reported more than 80 hours on his time sheet for a two-week period. The Executive Director
ordered the hearing officer to change his time sheet to show 80 hours worked for the time period.
The ALJ altered his time sheet to show 80 hours, but submitted it with a statement that he was
submitting a false time sheet. The ALJ worked in the same general area as the office of the
Executive Director, and observed the Executive Director react angrily to the statement, but then
signed the time sheet.
6. The Agency ALJ was once threatened with termination by the same Executive Director
for issuing a Report and Recommended Decision concerning an Agency employee.
7. During the same Executive Director's last year in office, and some time after the ALJ had
been threatened with termination for the Report and Recommendation, the Executive Director issued
a General Order prohibiting the ALJ from hearing any employee grievances. This was a significant
change in duties for the ALJ, as he had for many years prior to the new General Order, routinely
heard employee's grievances and made Reports and Recommendations for the Executive Director.
8. About two months after the General Order was issued, as the ALJ was giving employee
training to a group of Agency employees, he explained the General Order to the employees. One
employee asked, "How can we get a fair hearing?"
9. The ALJ was given a written reprimand by the same Executive Director on the last day
of that Director's administration. The ALJ felt that the reprimand was in retaliation for his open
disagreement with several of the Director's actions concerning Agency employees.
10. Prior to becoming Executive Director in July 1997, Pete Haun had worked for the federal
government in the Salt Lake City area for 25 years, in the field of pardons and parole. He then
worked on the Utah Board ofPardons from 1989 until his appointment as Executive Director of the
Agency. During these years, Mr. Haun became aware of some of the attitudes and perceptions of
employees in the Agency.
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General Order that prohibited the ALJ from hearing employee grievances. Mr. Haun instituted an
open door policy, and over the years of his administration, he visited many Agency facilities and
talked to hundreds of employees. He used the RAP Sheet, which was an Agency internal newsletter,
meetings with employees, and word of mouth to let the employees know they could file grievances
without fear of retaliation.
12. In October 1997, Mr. Haun wrote in the RAP Sheet, the Agency's in-house newsletter:
"Some of the immediate steps we have taken to promote positive
working conditions for employees include a top-to-bottom review of
the Code of Conduct, and a complete revision of staff discipline and
grievance procedures. Before the changes are adopted, we will ask
for suggestions and employee review. We will make these changes
available for your review by the beginning of December."
This information was repeated in a general way in the same newsletter, in a section entitled "Do You
Have Any Recommendations?"
13. Mr. Haun felt that the Bureau of Investigations within the Agency was generally
perceived by Agency employees as somewhat "high-handed" in its dealings with Agency employees.
It even investigated itself. He therefore decided to reorganize the Bureau. This decision· caused a
degree of dissatisfaction in some of the management employees of the Bureau, including some of
the Grievants.
14. Approximately 150 audits of the Agency led to the conclusion that the Agency was out
of compliance with State laws, rules or policies in approximately 182 areas. One of these areas was
the use of commute cars by Agency management employees. Mr. Haun's decision to discontinue
the use of commute cars was to put the Agency in compliance with State requirements.
15. On December 16, 1997, Mr. Haun issued a letter to employees of the Gunnison facility,
advising the employees of his intent to visit the facility and meet with employees. As a response to
communications he had previously received, Mr. Haun specifically stated that retribution against
employees for stating concerns or problems would not be tolerated.
16. After making the announcement of his planned visit to the Gunnison facility, Mr. Haun
received an anonymous call or letter saying that people would not come forward out of fear.

Mr. Haun' s prior experience with anonymous communications led him to believe there was no merit
to the claim.

Hurst, et al v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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change an institutional culture. Mr. Haun felt this was particularly true for an institutional culture

as deeply seated as the Agency's.
18. A current employee of the Agency, Mr. Lebounty, was involuntarily transferred twice
during the 1990's. The second involuntary transfer occl..UTed during Mr. Haun' s administration.
19. One of the Grievants, Harold Johnson, who was serving as Deputy Warden in July 1997
when Mr. Haun became Executive Director of the Agency, saw several staff members who were
transferred, demoted or dismissed after filing grievances prior to Mr. Haun' s administration.
20. One of the Grievants, Daniel Leatham, heard a rumor after his commute car was taken
away, that the cars were taken away because the Agency did not want to be obligated for on-call pay.

Mr. Leatham thereafter researched whether on-call time_ was compensable for management
employees. After concluding that on-call time was cotnpensable for himself and others in his
situation, Mr. Leatham told his fellow Grievants about his conclusion. Mr. Leatham's research
occurred during the first or second week of January 1998.
21. State employees have been entitled to on-call pay by Utah Administrative Code (1997)

R4 77-8-6(8)(c)(i) or its predecessors since at least 1991.
22. Grievants filed their grievance with the Department Head, Mr. Haun, on February 5,
1998.
23. When the grievance reached Executive Director Haun' s level, he remanded it to
Scott Carver, an employee in the Division oflnstitutional Operations, with an invitation to Grievants
to mediate the matter with Mr. Carver.
24. After receiving the invitation from Mr. Haun to mediate their grievance, Grievants met
with Mr. Carver. At some point in the meeting between .Mr. Carver and Grievants, Mr. Carver told
Grievants that he, Carver, would not have filed a grievance because "that's just something you don't
do over this kind of issue."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

r.

The time !imitations contained in §67- I 9a-40 r(5)(a), Utah Code, are jurisdictional and

constitute a limit on the scope of relief that can be granted to Grievants.
~. The time limitation contained in §67-19a-401(5)(b), Utah Code, is jurisdictional and

constitutes an ultimate limit on the scope of relief that can be granted by State agencies and the
CSRB when considering grievances.

Hurst, eta/ v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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improper conduct or knowing violations of statute and policy that were not timely grieved.
4. Grievants did not have excusable neglect under Utah Code §67-19a-40 1(5)(a) and Utah

Administrative Code Rl37-l-13(3) for the late filing of their grievance.
5. Both the Agency and the CSRB are limited by Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(a) to granting
relief for a period of20 working days before F ebruary-5, 1998, and for all pay periods since that date
for which Grievants can establish by satisfactory evidence the amount of on-call time for which
compensation is owed them under the provisions of Utah Administrative Code (1997)
R4 77 -8-6(8)(c)(i).

DECISION
As noted in the original Step 5 decision, Grievants argue that they should be entitled to
recover on-call pay going back for a period of four years from the date of their grievance. They base
this argument on a theory that the 20-day time limit for filing grievances [§67-19a-401(5)] only
governs jurisdiction, and not the scope of recovery. That issue was fully discussed in the original
Step 5 decision.
The issue now to be decided is whether Grievants had excusable neglect for filing their
grievance more than 20 working days after the "event" or action which gave rise to their grievance.
The time at which the event arose in this case was discussed in some detail in the original Step 5
decision. The Hearing Officer notes that even if it is found that Grievants had excusable neglect for
the delay in filing their grievance in this case, excusable neglect does not extend beyond one year
from the date of the event giving rise to the grievance. Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(b) provides:

(b) Notwithstanding Subsection S(a) [excusable neglect], an
employee may not submit a grievance more than one year after the
event giving rise to the grievance.
This provision is clearly jurisdictional, in that it prohibits the consideration of any grievance that is
filed more than one year after the date of the event which is grieved.
Grievants seek compensation for on-call time as provided in Utah Administrative Code
R4 77-8-6-(7)(c), as it existed during the years Grievants were assigned to be on call. The Agency's
ALJ found as fact in his Report and Recommendation to the Agency's Executive Director that
Grievants had an objective fear of retaliation if they filed a grievance over the issue of on-call
compensation at any time prior to July 1997. The undersigned Hearing Officer, for purposes of
considering the Agency's Motion to Dismiss, accepted this finding in the original Step 5 decision.
Hurst, et al v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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the period of time for which Grievants were entitled to on-call compensation by going back
20 working days from the date the grievance was filed. The filing date of the grievance was fmmd
by the ALI to be February 11, 1998. The question of when the grievance was filed will be
considered at another point in this decision. It is sufficient for purposes of considering when the
grievable event occurred, that the event is not determined by the date of filing of the grievance.
In the original Step 5 decision, this Hearing Officer found that the grievable event or action
in this case occurred when the new Executive Director, Pete Haun, invited grievances in July 1997.
But this conclusion was based on the Hearing Officer's analysis of the case under the doctrine that
when considering a motion to dismiss, the evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Now that an evidentiary hearing has been held to gather evidence on the issue of
excusable neglect, it becomes necessary to also determine when the event giving rise to the grievance
actually occurred.
In Karber, 6 CSRB 57 (Step 6), 1997, the CSRB dealt with the question of whether ongoing
discussions constitute the event, or if the event or action occurs when the fma1 agency notice is
issued after discussions have been completed. The Karber decision established that the event or
action occurred when the notice was issued. There was no comparable notice or action taken in the
instant case.
We are given further guidance on the issue of what is the event or action in the case of

Kurt Zimmerman v. Department ofEnvironmental Quality, CSRB Case No. J.H. 52 (1991), which
was cited in the original Step 5 decision ofthis case, and which, like the instant case, involved a
question of compensation for on-call time. In Zimmerman, the CSRB Hearing Officer concluded
that "an action took place when Grievant started carrying a pager and received compensatory time
for doing so." In the instant case, Grievants did not receive compensation in any form for their
on-call time prior to July 1997. However, as noted in the original Step 5 decision, they knew they
were on call when they were given pagers and told to be available at any time whenever the pager
was activated.
Unfortunately, little evidence was offered as to when Grievants were first told that they
would be on call during their off-duty hours. However, neither side disputes that Grievants served
on call prior to July 1997. One Grievant, Mr. Steele, testified that he carried a pager or cell phone
for about 20 years. The Agency ALJ found, in his Report and Recommendation, that all of the
Grievants were entitled to compensation for on-call time during the period of time when they were
Hurst, eta/ v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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in sometime in February 1996. Thereafter, Grievant Slocum continued to be on call by reason of a
Post Order. Grievants Leatham, Steele, Johnson and Hurst were on call by virtue of the requirement
to carry pagers and the assignment of commute vehicles. These four Grievants had commute
vehicles from 1994 to January 1998. Grievants seek as their remedy compensation for on-call time
going back four years from the date oftheir grievance.
For purposes of this decision it is concluded that each of the Grievants carried a pager, had
a commute car, or was otherwise under a duty, by virtue of their management or supervisory
responsibilities, to be on call for four years prior to filing their grievance. Therefore, the action or
event pertinent to this case occurred at the time Grievants entered into a duty to be on call, or when
the State instituted its policy of compensating FLSA exempt employees for on-call time, whichever
occurred later.
Inasmuch as Zimmerman, which involved compensation for on-call time of an FLSA exempt
employee,_was decided in 1991, there can be no dispute that it was state policy to pay on-call
compensation four years prior to the filing of the grievance herein. Thus, the action or event which
gave rise to the instant grievance occurred four or more years prior to the filing of the grievance. 1
Having determined when the event giving rise to the grievance occurred, we are left with the
need to determine the basic issue for which this case was remanded; that is, did Grievants have
excusable neglect for the delay in filing their grievance? If, as concluded above, the action or event
occurred in 1994, the Agency, the CSRB Hearing Officer, and the CSRB itself would have no
jurisdiction to hear the instant grievance, because it was clearly filed more than one year after the
event. However, this case is not that simple and we must, therefore, understand the meaning of the
term "excusable neglect" as that term is used in Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(a).
First, we look to the statutory provision itself. §67-19a-40 1(5)( a) contains no language that
could be construed as a definition of the term. However, 401(5)(a) states "Unless the employee
meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule ..." [Emphasis added.] Thus, the
CSRB was given authority by the Legislature to make rules governing the requirements for excusable

1

While there may be some dispute as to this conclusion, the only evidence presented in the evidentiary
hearing on the point was Mr. Steele's testimony that he had carried a pager or cell phone for about 20 years.
However, the Agency ALJ's Report and Recommendation, with its Findings of Fact, was submitted as evidence by
the Agency. Grievants seek a remedy going back four years, which would take their grievance back to sometime in
1994. Inasmuch as the Agency's evidence supports Grievants' claim ofbeing on call from 1994 on, there appears to
be no dispute between the parties that the point in time when the action or "event'' from which the grievance arose
occurred in 1994. It may even have occurred earlier than 1994, but Grievants' claim only goes back the four years.
Hurst, et al v. Dept. ofCo"ections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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governing 'definitions ofterms, phrases, and words used in the grievance process established by this
chapter[.]"
CSRB R137-1-2 defines excusable neglect as follows;
"Excusable Neglect" means the exercise of due diligence by a
reasonably prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper
steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the person's own
carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard in the processing of a
grievance, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable
hindrance or accident. [Emphasis added.]
This definition is consistent with court decisions from the federal and numerous state jurisdictions.
See Words and Phrases, "Excusable Neglect."
There have been no court decisions in Utah specifically addressing the definition of
"excusable neglect" as used in Utah Code §67-19a-401(5)(a) or in Utah Administrative Code
Rl37-l-2.- However, the Utah Supreme Court's decision in the case of Reisbeck v. HCA Health
Services ofUtah, 2 P.3rd 447 (Utah 2000), provides an illuminating analysis of the term "excusable

neglect" as used in Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). That rule pertains to the
grounds on which a late appeal may be allowed in the appellate courts of Utah. While not directly
on point with the issue presented by the instant case, it gives some indication of the Court's view of
what constitutes excusable neglect.
The Court noted that the standards applicable to excusable neglect and good cause, as those
terms are used in URCP 4(e), are separate, if not distinct, standards. The court stated:
By this standard, it is apparent rule 4(e) permits a trial court to extend
the time for filing a notice of appeal based on two general categories
of justification: (1) excusable neglect, which is an admittedly
neglectful delay that is nevertheless excused by special
circumstances; or (2) good cause, which pertains to special
circumstances that are essentially beyond a party's control.
[Emphasis in original.]
Reisbeck, at 450. The court further explained that "good cause remains a more liberal standard."

Id
The CSRB definition of excusable neglect actually combines elements of both excusable
neglect and good cause. It clarifies that the delay in filing a grievance or moving it forward cannot
be the result of the grievant's own carelessness, inattention or willful disregard of the grievance
Hurst, eta/ v. Dept. ofCorrections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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an accident. A hindrance is generally defined as an impediment or obstacle to any action. See
Webster's Twentieth Century Dictionary (1937), or Webster's New International Dictionary (1988

Edition). In this case, Grievants contend that their delay was caused by an unavoidable hindrance,
referring specifically to their fear of retaliation if they filed a grievance.
The Reisbeck court quoted with approval the holding in the case of West v. Grand County,
942 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), that excusable neglect cases are "highly fact intensive." The facts of the
instant case, as presented at the evidentiary hearing, compel the conclusion that prior to July 1997,
there was genuine cause for fear of retaliation at the Agency. However, did that fear constitute an
unavoidable hindrance to filing the grievance?
§67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(1) The department shall establish a career service system designed in a manner that
will provide for the effective implementation of the following merit principles:

***

(g) providing a formal procedure for processing the appeals and
grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion, restraint,
or reprisal.

***

(2) The principles in Subsection (1) shall govern interpretation and implementation
of this chapter.
To allow an administration to create or maintain an atmosphere in which employees are afraid to
exercise their rights and lay claim to benefits for which they qualify, because they know that such
an exercise will result in adverse personnel action, is contrary to the intent and purpose of the
Personnel Management Act. Therefore, this Hearing Officer must agree with Grievants that fear of
retaliation prior to July 1997 was sufficient on the facts of this case to constitute an unavoidable
hindrance, and imbued Grievants' failure to file a timely grievance with excusable neglect for
purposes of §67-19-401(5)(a).
This brings us to the crux of this case, which is whether the fear of retaliation was justified
by the facts of the case from July 1997 to the date on which Grievants fmally filed their grievance.
To summarize the facts, without minimizing the reality of the atmosphere in which Grievants
worked, we know the following: The new Executive Director in July 1997, Pete Haun, came to the
Agency with an awareness of its culture of personnel administration. Mr. Haun immediately made
changes such as rescission of the General Order prohibiting the Agency ALI from hearing employee
Hurst, et al v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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Grievants were told to report on-call time for periods when each was the Officer-in-Charge.

Mr. Haun made it clear that there would be no retaliation for filing of grievances. He made
an extensive effort to let employees know that he wanted to improve working conditions in the
Agency.
The Hearing Officer notes that Grievant Leatham testified he was told for nine years that as
an FLSA exempt employee, he was not entitled to on-call compensation. Had the Agency, through
any of its management employees, intentionally or negligently withheld from Grievants the
knowledge oftheir entitlement to on-call compensation, such conduct could, in some circumstances,
constitute an unavoidable hindrance which would invoke the excusable neglect standard on behalf
of Grievants. However, in this case the knowledge of a right or entitlement to on-call compensation
was not limited to a select few in the Agency. Rather, it was a matter of State administrative rule,

which was open to all employees and to all members of the public. Furthermore, Grievants began
reporting a.portion of their on-call time in July 1997, after Mr. Haun became the Agency Executive
Director. Thus, Grievants' contention that they did not know of their right to claim on-call
compensation is not convincing.
In addition, Grievant Leatham testified that after he turned in his commute car, he heard a
rumor that the commute cars were taken away so the Agency would not have to pay on-call
compensation. Mr. Leatham then decided to research the issue and learned of his entitlement to
on-call compensation. The result of his research clearly shows that the information was readily
available at any time, had he or any ofthe other Grievants chosen to look at the State rules governing
on-call compensation.

Mr. Haun acknowledged in his testimony that an agency culture is not changed quickly.
According to his own studies, such a change may take as many as seven years to be fully
implemented. Assuming the validity of Mr. Haun's observations, the facts remain that the State
administrative rule governing on-call compensation was readily available to Grievants at any time.
What is more important, Grievants became aware of their entitlement to some form of on-call
compensation in July 1997, when they began reporting such time during periods when they were the
Officer-in-Charge.
Finally, there is an inherent inconsistency in Grievants' argument that they continued to fear
possible retaliation after July 1997, while simultaneously reporting on-call time for which they were
compensated. Considering all of the foregoing facts, the Hearing Officer feels compelled to
Hurst, eta/ v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 CSRB/H.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand
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gnevance.
In its Remand Order, the Board noted in a footnote that the actual date on which the
grievance was filed is unclear. The Agency concluded that it was filed on February 11, 1998. The
grievance itself was dated January 30, 1998. The CSRB received a copy of the grievance on
February 5, 199 8. Although the question of when the grievance was actually filed with the Agency
was discussed in the evidentiary hearing after remand, no additional evidence was offered, and the
parties continued to disagree on the issue. In the absence of any evidence from the Agency
establishing when the grievance was actually received in the office of the Executive Director, the
Hearing Officer must conclude that the date a copy was received in the office of the CSRB,
February 5, 1998, is the proper date ofthe grievance.

DECISION
The grievance to the Agency Head in this case was filed on February 5, 1998. Grievants met
the standard for excusable neglect in failing to file a grievance for on-call compensation prior to the
14th pay period in July 1997, when they began reporting on-call time. Grievants were not, however,
subject to unavoidable hindrance after the 14th pay period in 1997, and therefore did not meet the
excusable neglect standard after that time. Therefore, Grievants are entitled to on-call compensation
for any time they can prove by satisfactory evidence that they served on call beginning at a point
20 working days prior to February 5, 1998, and continuing thereafter for as long as they were
required to be on call.

DATED this 8th day of January 2003.

<~

r<.:Allimzabcl

Hearing Officer
Career Service Review Board

RECONSIDERATION
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b).
APPEAL
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(1)(a)(i).

Hurst, et alv. Dept. ofCorrections, 19 CSRBIH.O. 273 Step 5 Decision on Remand

Page 12

0003(

Exhibit C

Dan Leatham, Bob Steele, Tim Slocum,
Bill Johnson, and Fred Hurst,
Petitioners,

Report and Recommendation

Case No. 98 HLH 5-G
vs.
ALJ R. Spencer Robinson

Department of Corrections,
Division of Institutional Operations,
Respondent

The parties appeared before this ALJ on May 9, 2000. Mr. Phillip W. Dyer represented
the grievants. Mr. Ed Kingsford represented the Department. The hearing was held as part of the
Department=s internal grievance procedure, in consonance with the rules established by the
Career Service Review Board under 67-19a-203, and under the authority of 64-13-28.
An audio tape record of the hearing was made. The parties called witnesses, who testified
under oath, and introduced documents into evidence. The record was left open to allow Mr. Dyer
to submit totals of the dollar amounts his clients claiming. That information arrived on May 10
and 11, 2000. The record was then closed. Based on the evidence provided by the parties, and
information in the records of the Department, this ALJ makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The grievants were career service employees at the time of filing the grievance on or
about February 11, 1998. Messrs. Leatham, Steele, Slocum, and Hurst are presently
employed by the Department of Corrections. Mr. Johnson retired after the filing of the
grievance.

2.

Grievants were all part of the upper management of the Division of Institutional
Operations during the times relevant to this grievance. They were told they were FLSA
exempt. For most of the time since 1994 they were not required to complete time sheets
They began completing time sheets in July of 1997. The time sheets were for periods
when they served as the Officer In Charge. They claimed and received on-call pay as
listed on those time sheets.

3.

Grievants were given pagers in order to facilitate contact with them. They were expected
to respond if the pager was activated. They were expected to remain within the range of

000013

the pager unless on approved leave or if they had permission of their supervisors.
4.

While on the pagers, grievants were able to remain at their homes, shop, dine out, attend
movies, go to church, and engage in other personal activities. The grievants had to plan
for alternative means for family members to return home should they be paged and asked
to come in. There were times personal activities were interrupted by pages. The
frequency of these interruptions was not established by the evidence.

5.

Grievants were assigned commute vehicles. Documents introduced by the grievants
establishes they had approved commute vehicles in 1995. The Request of Commute
Authorization forms bear the signatures of former Division of Institutional Operations
Director J. Terry Bartlett and former Executive Director 0. Lane McCotter. An illegible
signature appears on the line for the Department of Administrative Services
Representative.

6.

Department records contain Request for Commute Authorization for all the grievants
signed by former Division of Institutional Operations Director Terry Bartlett and former
Executive Director 0. Lane McCotter on March 31, 1997. No signature from a DAS
representative appears on the copies of these documents. Department records contain DF61's from January of 1998 for Messrs Steele, Hurst, and Johnson with vehicle information
matching that listed on the above noted Requests for Commute Authorization for those
gentlemen.

7.

Mr. Slocum testified that in February of 1996 he turned in his commute vehicle.

8.

Mr. Slocum=s Post Order, FW 08 Deputy Bureau Chief- Support Services BureauDraper Site, states the incumbent shall Acarry a pager and respond to service upon
activation during day or night. FW 08/02.01 (E)(l)(g).

9.

Mr. Leatham testified he had a commute vehicle through 1998. Mr. Steele testified he
had a commute vehicle from 1994 to January of 1998. Mr. Johnson testified he had a
commute vehicle from 1994 to 1998. Mr. Hurst testified he had a commute vehicle from
1994 to 1998. Documents within the Department of Corrections indicate these grievants
lost their commute vehicles at the end of January 1998.

10.

Beginning in pay period 13 in 1997 Messrs Leatham and Steele submitted time sheets
listing on-call hours. Messrs Johnson and Hurst did so in pay period 14 of 1997. Mr.
Slocum did so in pay period 25 of 1998. They were compensated for the on-call time
listed on the time sheets. These time sheets reflect grievants= assignment as the Officer
in Charge (OIC).

11.

Under the previous administration the grievants did not submit time sheets. It was their
understanding that the previous administration did not want hours worked documented.

2
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The grievants understood part of the reason for them not submitting time sheets was that
they were considered FLSA exempt.
12.

The grievants had a subjective fear of retaliation if they challenged the practices of the
previous administration. The grievants had been subject to transfers and had seen others
transferred. They drew the inference that individuals challenging the previous
administration would experience retaliation.

13.

In 96 OLM 6-D, an employee of the Department was served an Administrative Complaint
informing her she was being demoted and transferred. She requested a hearing, as
provided in AE 03. An audit of her position and activities followed. She was then served
an Amended Administrative Complaint informing her that her employment would be
terminated. Following the hearing, an employee in the office ofDivision of Institutional
Operations Director Bartlett, who participated in the audit, made a comment to this ALJ.
She said that if the subject of the disciplinary action had not appealed the original
Administrative Complaint that the Department would not have pursued the matter further,
despite the information the audit produced. This ALJ noted the comment in his Report
and Recommendation.

14.

The grievants= fear of retaliation if they had filed a grievance under the previous
administration was objectively reasonable.

15.

The new administration, which took office in July of 1997, stated it would not retaliate
against people who filed grievances and that if employees had grievances they should file
them. No evidence was produced to show these representations have proven false. If the
grievants harbored fears of retaliation for filing this grievance, they were not objectively
reasonable.

16.

The grievants also testified they were not aware they could claim on-time until shortly
before they filed the grievance.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Grievants were all career service employees at the time they filed the grievance, and thus
were eligible to use the grievance process.

2.

It is the event, not the discovery of a legal theory on which one may make a claim, that
triggers the running of the period of limitations. Grievants discovery of a legal theory
does not control. See Anderson v. Dean Witter Revnolds, 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct.App.
1996).

3.

Absent excusable neglect, 67-19a-40 1 permits the filing of a grievance Aonly if the
employee submits the grievance@ within twenty working days of the event giving rise to

3
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the grievance or knowledge of the event. This ALI agrees with the CSRB interpretation
of this statute in Karber v. Utah Department of Corrections, 6 CSRB 57 (1997). Filing
within twenty working days is mandatory. Failure to timely file is jurisdictional.
4.

Assuming the actions of the previous administration would bring the grievants failure to
file within the definition of excusable neglect, the current administration=s statements
regarding grievances, and the seven month period the grievants had to observe the
response of the administration to grievances before they filed, takes them outside of
excusable neglect.

5.

Grievants are eligible for on-call pay for a period of twenty working days back from the
date they filed the grievance, and prospectively from the date of filing, if the evidence
shows they were on-call.

6.

Management has the discretion to go back one year from the date the grievants filed. See
67-19a-401 (5)(b).

7.

Article XVI, Section 6 of the Utah State Constitution does not apply in this case.
Grievants requested remedy was to be made whole for lost on-call compensation. Time
spent on-call does not fall within the definition ofhours worked found in R477-l-l (3).
Being on-call is not part of the work day.

8.

The extent of interference with grievants time, based on the evidence in the record, does
not establish grievants were on-call as that term has been interpreted by the federal courts
in FLSA cases. See Norton v. Worthen Van Service, Inc., 839 F.2d 653 (lOth Cir. 1988),
Boehm v. Kansas Citv Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182 (lOth Cir. 1989) and Renfro v.
City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529 (lOth Cir. 1991), Gilligan v. City ofEmpori1!, 986 F.2d
410, (lOth Cir. 1993), Andrews V. Town of Skiatook, 123 F.3d 1327, 123 F.3d 1327 (lOth
Cir. 1997).

9.

At the time the grievance was filed, R477-8-6(8)(c)(i) read as follows:
AOn-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call
work shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the
employee is on-call.
(i) Time is considered Aon-call time@ when the employee has freedom of
movement in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty.@

(ii) Employees record on-call time as Aon-call paid@ not as Ahours worked@ on
their time sheet, and shall be paid the following pay period. Any time actually
worked during the on-call period is recorded in increments of 15 minutes as
Ahours worked@ in addition to on-call time.@

4
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10.

Following this becoming an issue, DHRM amended its rule. Effective in June of 1998
R477-8-6 (c) read:
(c) On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call
work shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the
employee is on-call. (i) Time is considered "on-call time" when the employee has
freedom of movement in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty.
(ii) An employee must be directed by his supervisor, either verbally or in writing, that he
is on call for a specified time period. Carrying a beeper or cell phone shall not constitute
on call time without a specific directive from a supervisor. (iii) The employee shall record
the hours spent in on call status on his time sheet in order to be paid.

11.

Under either defmition of Aon-call@ Mr. Slocum=s Post Order puts him in that status.
He is entitled to on-call pay during the twenty working day period prior to February 11,
1998. Management has the discretion, but not the duty, to compensate him during the
year preceding the filing of his grievance. Mr. Slocum is also entitled prospectively to oncall pay until his Post Order or assignment changed, or until he was expressly instructed
to disregard that portion of his Post Order, or in some other way put on actual notice that
someone with the authority to do so had altered his duties as the Deputy Warden of
Support Services. Mr. Slocum should submit amended time sheets reflecting those
periods when he was on-call. This ALJ retains jurisdiction to take evidence on the issues
regarding Mr. Slocum=s status prospectively from February 11, 1998, if necessary.

12.

Messrs Leatham, Steele, Johnson, and Hurst are entitled to on-call pay for the twenty
working day period prior to February 11, 1998, during which they were assigned a
commute vehicle. Management has the discretion, but not the duty, to compensate them
during the year preceding the filing of this grievance. One of the conditions in the
Division of Administrative Services (DAS) rules for being given a commute vehicle is
being on-call. See DAS Rule 15.4, section 8, which requires the employee being given
the commute vehicle to be on-call as defmed in R477-8-6 (c). Rule 15.4 incorporates the
DHRM definition of on-call by reference. The meaning of on-call must be the same
whether the issue is a commute vehicle or pay. The grievants cannot be on-call in order
to qualify for the commute vehicle, but not on-call for purposes of pay. Messrs Leatham,
Steele, Johnson, and Hurst should submit amended time sheets reflecting those periods
when they were on-call by virtue of having a commute vehicle.

13.
14.

Inasmuch as the parties may not have anticipated the bases for this ALJ=s decision,
jurisdiction is retained to clarify or supplement the record.
DISCUSSION

This ALJ previously denied the grievants= motion to amend to include Article XVI,
Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. Nothing coming forth since that decision on February 7,
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2000, has altered this ALJ=s decision regarding the motion to amend.
Had the motion to amend been granted, it is unlikely the FLSA multiplier of time and onehalf would have been applied to the time grievants were on-call. Federal courts interpreting and
applying the FLSA did not characterize the grievants= circumstances as compensable under the
FLSA. In this ALJ=s view, being made whole is receiving one hour of pay for every twelve
hours of on-call, not time and one-half their hourly pay for every hour outside of regular hours. It
seems logical that if the FLSA concept oftime and one-half is to be invoked, the FLSA concept
of on-call should also apply. The grievants do not meet the FLSA on-call standard.
As set forth above, this ALJ finds he has jurisdiction to address the requested remedy
back twenty working days from the date the grievance was filed. The Executive Director has the
discretion to go back one year. Arguments that other periods of limitation should be applied in
this forum were not persuasive.
This ALJ recommends the grievants be compensated for on-call time during the twenty
working day period preceding the filing of their grievance, and prospectively to the extent they
can establish eligibility for compensation under the legal basis set forth in this Report and
Recommendation. This ALJ recommends no additional compensation be granted.
Dated this twenty-second day of May 2000.

R. Spencer Robinson
Administrative Law Judge
Utah Department of Corrections
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Either party may request a meeting with the Executive Director to review this Report and
Recommendation. The granting of such a review is discretionary, and is not a new hearing. It
must be requested within five working days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation.
Executive Director review must be requested in writing. Employee requests constitute a
written waiver of the time period imposed for the Executive Director to respond at Level4 of the
grievance process. Requests by the Division Director shall be accompanied by a written waiver
of the time limits from the employee.
If review is not requested within five working days of receipt of the Report and
Recommendation, it will become the Final Order. This Order is final except in the following
matters: promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary,
violation of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reduction
in force and disputes concerning abandonment of position. These matters may be appealed to the
Career Service Review Board by employees dissatisfied with the Department's decision.
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Exhibit D

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Michael 0. Leavitt
Governor
H.L. Haun
Executive Director

6100 South Fash1on Place Boulevard - Su1te 400
Murray Utah 841 0 7
(801) 265-5512
FAX (80 I) 265-5726

Dan Leatham, Bob Steele, Tim Slocum,
Bill Johnson, and Fred Hurst,
Petitioners,

JAN 2 4 2001
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

Final Order

Case No. 98 HLH 5-G
vs.
Department of Corrections,
Division ofinstitutional Operations,
Respondent.
Both parties appealed the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge. Former
Executive Director Haun met with the grievants. On September 6, 2000, Mr. Haun remanded the
case to Division of Institutional Operations Scott Carver with an invitation to the grievants to
mediate this matter.
On January 12, 2001, Mr. Philip Dyer, the attorney for the grievants, sent a facsimile
transmission to the ALJ. He stated that on behalf of his clients he declined any further efforts to
mediate the matter and asked the ALJ to refer it to me for a Final Order.
The grievants' requested remedy is compensation for being on-call, dating four years
back from the filing of the grievance. They argue that they should receive 1 and V2 times their
hourly pay for every hour they were on-call. Their argument is based, in part, on Article XVI,
Section 6 of the Utah State Constitution. They claim that since eight hours constitutes a day's
work, the carrying of the pager and responding to it when activated constituted work. They also
seek the multiplier of time and 1/z by drawing on the Fair Labor Standards Act.
This was not part of the original grievance. They moved to amend the grievance to
include Article XVI, Section 6. The ALJ rejected the argument, citing R477-1-l (3), which
defines actual hours worked as, "Time spent performing duties and responsibilities associated
with the employee's job assignments." It goes on to state that "on-call time" is excluded from
hours worked. I agree with the ALJ that on-call time, since it is not hours worked, is not part of
the work day. Therefore, Article XVI, Section 6 is not applicable.
There is also an issue about the period of limitations applicable in this case. The
grievants have asserted the period of limitations is four years. I disagree. The applicable period
is twenty working days from the event or knowledge of it. See 67 -19a-40 1.
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I accept those findings and conclusions of the ALJ necessary to find that the grievants
were on-call by virtue ofbeing assigned a commute vehicle, or, in Mr. Slocum's case, by virtue
of his Post Order. I find there is no excusable neglect justifying the failure to file earlier. I will
not exercise discretion to go back more than twenty working days from the date the grievance
was filed.
Based on that, I order that Mr. Leatham, Mr. Steele, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Hurst, be
permitted to submit amended time sheets listing on-call time back twenty working days from the
date they filed their grievances until the time they surrendered their commute vehicles at the end
of January of 1998. They are to be paid one hour's pay for every twelve hours they were on -call
during that period of time.
Mr. Johnson is no longer an employee. Therefore, he cannot be paid from payroll. He
must be paid through accounts payable. He must sign an agreement accepting responsibility for
the taxes.
Mr. Slocum shall also be permitted to submit amended time sheets for the period of
twenty working days back from February 11, 1998, and prospectively until his Post Order or
assignment changed, or until he had actual notice his duties as Deputy Warden of Support
Services no longer included carrying a pager and responding to it on activation, day or night. If
there is a dispute between Mr. Slocum and the Division ofinstitutional Operations as to when he
ceased to be eligible for on-call pay based on his Post Order, either party may request a hearing
before the ALJ. That hearing shall be limited to establishing when his Post Order or assignment
changed, or when he had actual notice that his duties as Deputy Warden of Support Services no
longer included carrying a pager and responding to it on activation, day or night.
Dated this

//1

day of--r--fff--'---..:.::_-HENT OF CORRECTIONS

Mike Chabries
Executive Director

98 HLH 5-G
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
If you are dissatisfied, you may appeal this Final Order to the Career Service
Review Board in accordance with law and the rules of the CSRB. Notice of appeal must be filed
within ten working days ofreceipt of the Final Order. Failure to file a timely appeal to the
Career Service Review Board may result in dismissal of the appeal.
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Exhibit E

Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 11. [Courts open- Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an IDJury done
to hun m ills person, property or reputatJ.on, shall have
remedy by due course of law, wlllch shall be adrmrustered
Wlthout derual or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be
barred from prosecutmg or defenfung before any tnbunal m
tills State, by hunself or counsel, any CIVll cause to wlllch he 1s
a parj;y
1896

Exhibit F

67-19-3.1

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
67-19-3.1.

Principles governing interpretation of chap·
ter and adopt~on of rules.
(1) The department shall establish a career service system
designed in a manner that will provide for the effective
implementation of the following merit principles:
(a) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on
the basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and~;kills,
including open consideration of qualified applicants for
initial appointment;
(b) providing for equitable and competitive compensation;
(c) training employees as needed to assure high-quality
performance;
(d) retaining empl'oyees on the basis of the adequacy of
their performance and separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected;
'
(e) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all
aspects of personnel administration without regard to
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, political affiliation, age, or disability, and with proper regard for their
privacy and constitutional rights as citizens;
(f) providing information to employees regarding their
political rights and the prohibited practices under the
Hatch Act; and
(g) providing a formal. procedure for processing the
appeals and grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion, restraint, or reprisal. (2) The principles in Subsection (1) shall govern interpre2000
tation and implementation ofthi§ chapter.
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receiving the positive test results or be subJect to further
disciplinary procedures established by rule of the executive director in accordance with Section 67-19-34.
1990
67-19-39. Exemptions.
Peace officers, as defined under 'Iltle 53, Chapter 13, Peace
officer Classmcations, acting m their official capacity as peace
officers in undercover roles and assignments, are exempt from
t]ie provisions of this act.
2002
67-19-40. Repealed.

1997

61-19-41. Cost-Savings Suggestions Pilot Program Forms -Application- Evaluation -Awards.
(1) There is created the Cost-Savmgs Suggestions Pilot
Program.
(2) The department shall:
(a) consult with state agencies to select two to four
state departments or divisrons to participate in the pilot
program;
(b) create a form for an employee to make suggestions
that will save costs for an employee's agency; and
(c) distribute the form to the parbcipating state agencies for drstnbution to employees.
(3) An employee of a participating agency Wlth a costsaving suggestion shall:
(a) complete the form outlining the cost-savmg suggestion; and
(b) submit it to the employee's agency director and the
department.
(4) (a) (i) An agency director who receives a cost-saving
suggestion from an employee shall, within 30 days,
evaluate the suggestion to determine if the suggestion is feasrble and might result ~ savings for the
agency.
(ii) If the suggestion cannot be adequately evaluated within 30 days, the agency drrector may extend
the evaluation period for an additional 30 days by
notifying the employee and the department of the
extension.
(b) (i) The department shall submit the suggestion to
the panel of examiners for the Utah Quahty Servi-ee
Award Program.
(ii) The panel of examiners for the Utah Quality
Service Award Program shall:
(A) review the suggestion and submit their
comments to the agency director;
(B) if the suggestion appears to have application to agencies beyond the agency in which the
suggestion originated, refer the suggestion to
other agencies to which the suggestion may apply; and
(C) approve or deny the suggestions as eligible
for cost-saving awards as defined in Subsection

(d) forward Information describmg the implemented
suggestion and the agency's calculation ofthe annual cost
saving to the Divrsion of Finance; and
(e) If directed by the Division of Finance, calculate the
actual annual cost savmg for a period of one year after the
suggestion has been implemented.
(7) The Division of Finance shall:
(a) review and venfy the agency's cost-saving calculation; and
(b) report its findings to the department.
(8) (a) The panel of exammers for the Utah Quality Service
Award Program in the department shall review the calculated cost savings of the suggestion and the report of
the Divrsron of Finance and, if appropriate, authorize the
agency to award 10% of the annual cost savings, not to
exceed $5,000, to the employee.
(b) The agency may use the balance of the cost savings
to enhance programs and not to be used for bonuses, other
compensation, training, or travel.
(9) The department and the participating agencies shall
report to the Govement Operations Interim Committee by
September 1, 2003, concerning the results of this pilot program.
2000
CHAPTER 19a
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES

Part 1
General Provisions
Section
67-19a-101.

Defimtions.

Part2
Career Service Review Board
67-19a-201.
67-19a-202.
67-19a-203.
67-19a-204.

Career Servrce Review Board created - Members- Appomtment- Removal- TermsOrganization - Per diem and expenses.
Powers - Jurisdiction.
Rulemaking authority.
Administrator - Powers.

Part3
Grievance and Appeal Procedures
67-19a-301.
67-19a-302.
67-19a-303.

(8).
(5) After completing the evaluation, the agency director

shall notify the employee and the department, in writing, that
the suggestion·
(a) will be implemented; or
(b) will not be implemented, wrth a statement explaining why it will not be implemented.
(6) If the cost-saving suggestion is implemented, the agency
drrector shall:
(a) notify the department that the agency Wlll implement the suggestion;
(b) provide to the department an estimate of the potential annual cost savings to the agency;
(c) give the employee making the suggestion an initial
cash award of no less than $100 and no more than $200,
as determined by the agency director;

67-19-41

Charges submissible under grievance and appeals procedure.
Levels of appealability of charges submissible
under gnevance and appeals procedure.
Employees' rights in grievance and appeals
procedure.
Part4

Procedural Steps to Be Followed by Aggrieved
Employee
67-19a-401.
67 -19a-402.
67-19a-403.
67-19a-404.
67-19a-405
67-19a-406.

Time limits for submission of appeal by aggrieved employee - Voluntary termmation
of employment - Group gnevances.
Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved
employee.
Appeal to admirustrator- Jurisdictional hearing.
Administrator's responsibilities.
Prehearing conference.
Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved
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67-19a-101
Section
67-19a-407.
67-19a-408.

employee - Hearmg before hearmg officer
- EV1denbary and procedural rules.
Appeal to Career Semce Review Board.
Career Semce Review Board heanng - EV1dentiary and procedural rules.
PART1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

67-19a-101. Definitions.
As used m tl:us chapter
(1) "Admmistrator" means the person employed by the
board to assist in admimstering personnel policies.
(2) "Board" means the Career Semce ReVlew _"§oard
created by tbis chapter.
(3) "Career service employee" means a person employed in career semce as defined m Section 67-19-3.
(4) "Employer" means the state of Utah and all superVIsory personnel vested with the authority to implement
and administer the policieS of the department.
(5) "Gnevance" means:
(a) a complamt by a career service employee concerning any matter touchmg upon the relatwnship
between the employee and his employer; and
(b) any dispute between a career service employee
and his employer.
(6) "Supervisor" means the person to whom an employee reports and who assigns and oversees the employ1991
ee's work.
PART2
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
67-19a-201. Career Service Review Board created Members - Appointment - Removal Terms - Organization - Per diem and expenses.
(1) There IS created a Career Service Review Board
(2) (a) The governor shall appoint five members to the
board no more than three of which are members of the
same pohtical party.
(b) The governor shall appomt members ·whose gender
and ethmcity represent the career service work force.
(3) (a) The governor may remove any board member for
cause.
(b) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for tbe unexpired term.
(4) The governor shall ensure that appomtees to the board:
(a) are qualified by knowledge of employee relations
and merit system principles m pubhc employment; and
(b) are not:
(i) members of any local, state, or national committee of a pohtical party;
(ii) officers or members of a committee in any
partisan political club; and
(iii) holding or a candidate for a paid public office.
(5) (a) Except as reqmred by Subsectwn (b), the governor
shall appomt board members to serve four-year terms
beginning January 1.
(b) Notwithstanding the reqmrements of Subsection
(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment or
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that
the terms of board members are staggered so that approximately half of the board is appomted every two
years.
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(c) The members of the board shall serve until their
successors are appointed and qualified.
(6) Each year, the board shall choose a chair and vice chair
from Its own members.
(7) (a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the
transaction of busmess.
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is
present is action of the board.
(8) (a) Members shall receive no compensatiOn or benefits
for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of the member's official
duties at the rates established by the Division of Fmance
under Sections 63A-3·106 and 63A-3-107.
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for their service.
1996
67-19a-202. Powers- Jurisdiction.
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final administrative
body to review appeals from career service employees and
agencies of deciswns about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary,
violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equrtable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and
disputes concerning abandonment of position that have
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the grievance
procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide
any other personnel matters.
(2) The time hm1ts established in this chapter supersede
the procedural time limits established in Title 63, Chapter
46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(3) In conjunction with any mquiry, investigation, hearing,
or other proceedillg, any member of the board may:
(a) administer oaths;
(b) certify official acts;
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other eV1dence; and
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule.
1.991
67-19a-203. Rulemaking authority.
The board may make rules governing:
(1) definitions ofterms, phrases, and words used in the
grievance process established by this chapter;
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the waiver of time limits established by tlus
chapter;
(3) the applicatwn for and service of subpoenas, the
service and filing ofpleadmgs, and the issuance of rulings,
orders, determinatwns, summary Judgments, transcripts,
and other legal documents necessary in grievance proceedings;
(4) the use, callmg, attendance, participation, and fees
of witnesses in gnevance proceedings;
(5) continuances of grievance proceedings;
(q)' procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, unless governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b, the
Administrative Procedures Act;
(7) the presence of media representatives at grievance
··~
proceedmgs; and
(8) procedures for sealing fries-or makmg data pertaining to a grievance unavailable to the public.
1989
67-19a-204. Administrator- Powers.
(1) The governor shall appoint a person With demonstrated
ability to administer personnel policies to assist the board in
performing the functions specified in tills chapter
(2) (a) The administrator may:
(i) assign qualified, inlpartial hearillg officers on a
per case basis to adjudicate matters under the jurisdiction of the board;
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(ii) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation,
hearing, or other proceeding; and
(iii) upon motion made by a party or person to
whom the subpoena is directed and upon notice to the
party who issued the subpoena, quash or modify the
subpoena if it is unreasonable, requires an excessive
number of w1tnesses, or requests evidence not relevant to any matter in issue.
(b) In selecting and assigning hearing officers under
authority of this section, the administrator shall appoint
hearing officers that have demonstrated by education,
training, and experience the ability to adjudicate and
resolve personnel administration disputes by applying
employee relations principles within a large, public work
force.
1995

PART3
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under grievance and
appeals procedure.
(1) This grievance procedure may only be used by career
service employees who are not:
(a) public applicants for a position with the state's work
force;
(b) public employees of the state's political subdivisions;
(c) public employees covered by other grievance procedures; or
(dj employees of state in~titutions of higher education.
(2) Whenever a question or dispute exists as to whether an
employee is qualified to use this grievance procedure, the
ad)ninistrator shall resolve the question or dispute. The ad-rni.riistrator's decision is reviewable only by the Court of
Appeals.
'
(3) Any career service employee may submit a grievance
based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression,
including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act,
occurrence, omission, or condition for solution through the
grievance procedures set forth in this chapter.
~991
67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of charges submissible under grievance and appeals procedure.
(1), A career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages,
salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the
equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force,, and
disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of
grievance procedure.
(2) (a) A career service. employee may grieve au other
matters only to the level of his department head.
(b) The decision of the department head is final and
unappealable to the board.
1991
67-19a-303. Employees;-fights in grievance and appeals procedu~e.
(1) For the purpose qf:processing a grievance, a career
service employee may:
(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employee's choice to act as an advocate at any level of the
grievance procedure~
(b) request a reasonable amount of time during work
hou;rs_to confer with the representative and prepare the
grievance; and
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance
hearing.

67-19a-401

(2) ':fhe state shall allow employees to attend and testify at
the gr1evance heanng a~ wime:oses if the employee has given
reasonable advance notice to his 1nnediate supemsor.
(3) No person may take an! reprisals against any career
semce employee for use of gnevance procedures specified in
this chapter.
(4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a
grievance may not place grievance forms, grievance materials, correspondence about the grievance, agency and
department replies to the grievance, or other documents
relati."J.g to the grievance in the employee's personnel file.
(b) The employing agency of an employee who files a
grievance may place records of disciplinary action in the
employee's personnel file.
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is
rescinded through th_e grievance procedures established
in this chapter, the agency and the Department of Human
Resource Management shall remove the record of the
disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel
file and central personnel file.
(d) An agency may maintain a separate grievance file
relating to an employee's grievance, but shall discard the
1991
file after three years.

PART4
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY
AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by
aggrieved employee- Voluntary termination
of employment - Group grievances.
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part
3 and the restrictions contained in this part, a career service
employee may have a grievance addressed by following the
procedures specified in this part.
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is
directed may agree in writing to waive or extend grievance
steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits specified for those grievance
steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402.
' (3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be
submitted to the administrator.
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for
excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails
to process the grievance to the next step within the time
limits established in this part, he has waived his right to
process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the
grievance.
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for
excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails
to process the grievance to the next step v;>ithin the time
limits established in this part, the grievance is considered
to be settled based on the decision made at the last step.
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for
excusable neglect established by rule, an employee may
submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if
the employee submits the grievance:
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving
rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has
knowledge of the event giving rise to the grievance.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an employee
may not submit a gnevance more than one year after the
event giving rise to the grievance.
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employment with the state may not submit a grievance after he has
terminated his employment.
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same grievance,
they may submit a group grievance by following the
procedures and requirements of this chapter.

67-19a-402
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(b) In subrmttmg a group gr1evance, each aggrieved
employee shall s1gn the complamt.
(c) The ad=strator and board may not treat a group
grievance as a class action, but may select one aggrieved
employee's grievance and address that grievance as a test
case.
1999
67-19a-402. Procedural steps to be followed by ag. grieved employee.
(1) (a) A career semce employee who believes he has a
grievance shall attempt to resolve the grievance through
d1scussion Wlth h1s supervisor.
(b) W1thin :five days after the employee discusses the
grievance w1th h1m, the employee's supemsor may 1ssue
a verbal deciswn on the grievance.
(2) (a) If the grievance remams unanswered for :five working days after its subm1ssion, or if the aggrieved employee
is dissatis:fied w1th the supemsor's verbal deciswn, "tile
employee may resubmit the grievance in wnting to hls
immediate supervisor Wlthln five working days after the
exp1rabon of the period for response or receipt of the
decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five workmg days after the employee's written grievance is subnntted, the employee's supervisor
shall issue a written response to the grievance stating his
decision and the reasons for the deciswn.
(c) Immediately after submittmg the written grievance
to his supemsor, the employee shall notify the administrator of the board that he has subm1tted the written
grievance.
(3) (a) Ifthe written grievance submitted to the employee's
supervisor remains unanswered for five working days
after 1ts submission, or if the aggrieved employee is
dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may
submit the grievance in writing to hls agency or division
d1r~ctor within ten working days after the expiration of
the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is submitted, the employee's agency or
division director shall issue a written response to the
grievance statmg his decision and the reasons for the
decision.
(4) (a) If the written gnevance subm1tted to the employee's
agency or division d1rector remams unanswered for five
~orking days after 1ts submission, or if the aggrieved
employee is dissat1sfied with the dec1sion issued, the
employee may submit the grievance in writing to his
department head within ten workmg days after the expiratwn of the period for deciswn or rece1pt of the decision,
wh1chever is :first.
(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is subnntted, the department head shall
issue a written response to the grievance stating his
decision and the reasons for the decision.
(c) The dec1sion of the department head 1s final in all
matters except those matters that the board may review
under the authonty of Part 3.
(5) If the wntten grievance submitted to the employee's
department head meets the subJect matter requirements of
Section 67-19a-302 and 1f the grievance remains unanswered
for ten working days after its submisswn, or if the aggrieved
employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee
may subm1t the grievance in writing to the admmistrator
within ten working days after the exp1rabon of the period for
1991
deciswn or receipt ofthe decision, whichever 1s first.
67-19a-403. Appeal to administrator - Jurisdictional
hearing.
(1) At any time after a career service employee subnnts a
grievance to the admmistrator under the authority of Section
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67-19a-402, the administrator may attempt to settle the
grieva.'l.ce lllformally by conference, concli1atwn, and persua.
s1on with the employee and the agency.
(2) (a) w'hen an employee subm1ts a grievance to the ad.
ministrator under the authonty of Section 67-19a-4Q2
the administrator shall deterrmne.
'
(i) whether or not the employee is a career S8l:VJ.ce
employee and is entitled to use the grievance system·
(1i) whether or not the board has ]Urisd1chon ove;
the grievance;
(lii) whether or not the employee has been direct]v
harmed; and
(iv) the issues to be heard.
(b) In order to make the determmations required by
Subsection (2), the administrator may(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties
may present oral arguments, written arguments, or
both; or
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file.
(3) (a) If the administrator holds a jurisdictional heanng
he shall issue hls written dec1sion within 15 days after th~
hea.rmg is adjourned.
(b) If the administrator chooses to conduct an admin.
istrative review of the file, he shall issue his written
decision within 15 days after he receives the grievance
1991

67-19a-404. Administrator's responsibilities.
If the administrator determines that the grievance meets
the jurisdictional requirements of Part 3, he shall:
(1) appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the complaint; and
(2) set a date for the hearing that is either:
(a) not later than 30 days after the date the administrator issues his decision that the board has Jurisdlction over the grievance; or
(b) at a date agreed upon by the parties and the
administrator.
19B9
67-19a-405. Prehearing conference.
(1) The administrator may require the presence of each
party, the representatives of each party, and other designated
''
persons at a prehearing conference
(2) At the conference, the administrator may require th~
parties to:
(a) idenbfy whlch allegatwns are adnutted and which'
allegations are denied;
(b) submit a JOint statement detaihng:
(i) stipulated_ facts that are not in dispute;
(ii) the 1ssues to be decided; and
(iii) applicable laws and rules;
(c) s,ubnnt a list of witnesses, exh1bits, and papers or
other evidence that each party intends to offer as evidence; and
(d) confer in an effort to resolve or settle the grievance.
(3) At ~he conclusion of the prehearmg conference, the
adm1mstrator may require the parties to prepare a written
statement idenhfymg:
(a) the items presented or .agreed to under Subsectwn
(2); and
(b) the issues remaining to be resolved by the hearmg
process.
(4) The prehearmg conference 1s mfonnal and is not open to
the public or press.
!9B9
67-19a-406. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved employee - Hearing before hearing
officer- Evidentiary and procedural rules.
(1) (a) The adnunistrator shall employ a certified court
reporter to record the hearmg and prepare an official
transcnpt of the heanng.
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(b) The official transcnpt of the proceedmgs and all
exillb1ts, bnefs, mobons and pleadmgs received by the
hearmg officer are the official record of the proceedmg
(2) (a) The agency has the burden of proof m all gnevances
resultmg from d1snnssals, demotwns, suspensions, wnt
ten repnmands, reductwns m force, and disputes concern
mg abandonment of pos1hon
(b) The employee has the burden of proof m all other
gnevances
(c) The party Wlth the burden of proof must prove therr
case by substantial evidence
(3) (a) The heanng officer shall 1ssue a wntten deciswn
Wlthm 20 workmg days after the hearmg IS adJourned
(b) If the heanng officer does not Issue a decision
Wlthm 20 workmg days, the agency that IS a party to the
gnevance 1s not hable for any claimed .4ack wages or
benefits after the date the decision IS due
(4) The hearmg officer may
(a) not award attorneys' fees or costs to e1ther party,
(b) close a heanng by complymg w1th the procedures
and requrrements ofTltle 52, Chapter 4, Open and Pubhc
Meetmgs,
(c) seal the file and the ev1dence produced at the
heanng lithe eVldence rmses questwns about an employee's character, professwnal competence, or phys1cal or
mental health,
(d) grant contmuances accordmg to board rule, and
(e) dec1de questwns or d1sputes conceDllng standmg m
1996
accordance w1th Sectwn 67-19a-301
67-19a-407. Appeal to Career Service Review Board.
(1) (a) The employee or the agency may appeal the heanng
officer's dec1s10n on a gnevance to the board If
(1) the appealmg party files a notlce of appeal w1th
the adrmmstrator w1thm ten workmg days after the
rece1pt of the deciswn or the exp1rat10n of the penod
for declSion, wh1chever IS first, and
(n) the appeahngparty meets the reqmrements for
appeal estabhshed ill Subsection (2)
(b) The appealmg party shall submit a copy of the
official transcnpt of the hearmg to the admm1strator
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearmg
officer's dec1s1on on a gnevance to the board only 1f the
appeahng party alleges that
(a) the hearmg officer did not 1ssue a dec1s10n w1thm 20
workmg days after the heanng adJourned,
(b) the appealmg party 1s d1ssatls:fied w1th the dec1s1on,
(c) the appealmg party beheves that the dec1s10n was
based upon an mcorrect or arb1trary mterpretatwn of the
facts, or
(d) the appealmg party beheves that the hearmg officer
made an erroneous concluswn oflaw
1989
67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing EVIdentiary and procedural rules.
(1) The board shall
(a) hold a heanng to reVlew the hearmg officer's deciswn not later than 30 days after It receiVes the offic1al
transcnpt and the bnefs,
(b) reVlew the dec1s10n of the heanng officer by consldenng the offic1al record of that heanng and the bnefs of
the parties, and
(c) 1ssue Its wntten deciSIOn addressmg the heanng
officer's dec1s10n w1thm 40 workmg days after the record
for 1ts proceedmg 1s closed
(2) In adilltwn to whatever other remedy the board grants,
1t may order that the employee be placed on the reappomtment roster prov1ded for by Section 67-19-17 for ass1gnment to
another agency

67-19c-101

(3) If the board does not Issue Its wntten decision w1thm 40
workmg days after closmg the record, the agency that 1s a
party to the gnevance JS not liable for any claimed back wages
or benefits after the date the deCisiOn 1s due
(4) The board may not award attorneys' fees or costs to
e1ther party
(5) The board may close a hearmg by complymg With the
procedures and reqmrements ofTltle 52, Chapter 4, Open and
Pubhc Meetmgs
(6) The board may seal the file and the eVIdence produced
at the hearmg u the evidence raises questwns about an
employee's character, professiOnal competence, or phys1cal or
mental health
1996
CHAPTER 19b
SUGGESTION AWARDS PROGRAM [REPEALED]
67-19b-101 to 67-19b-303.

Repealed.

1993

CHAPTER 19c
EMPLOYEE RECOGNITION
SectiOn
67-19c-101

Department award program

67-19c-101. Department award program.
(1) As used m tlns sectwn
(a) "Department" means the Department of Adnnmstratlve Serv1ces, the Department of Agr1culture and Food,
the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Commuruty
and Econonnc Development, the Department of Corrections the Department of Workforce Services, the Department of EnVIronmental Quahty, the Department ofFmancial Instltutwns, the Department of Health, the
Department of Human Resource Management, the Department of Human Serv1ces, the Insurance Department,
the National Guard, the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Pubhc Safety, the Pubhc
Service CommisSIOn, the Labor Comrmsswn~ the State
Board ofEducatwn, the State Board of Regents, the State
Tax CommJsswn, and the Department of TransportatiOn
(b) "Departlnent head" means the millVldual or body of
millviduals m whom the ultimate legal authonty of the
department Js vested by law
(2) There IS created a department awards program to
award an outstandillg employee ill each department of state
government
(3) (a) By Apnl 1 of each year, each department head shall
sohcit nommatwns for outstanding employee of the year
for lns department from the employees m lns department
(b) By July 1 of each year, the department head shall
(I) select a person from the department to receiVe
the outstandmg employee ofthe year award usmg the
cntena established m SubsectiOn (c), and
(n) announce the recipient of the award to lns
employees
(c) Department heads shall make the award to a person
who demonstrates
(1) extraordmary competence m perfonnmg his
function,
(n) creativity m Identuymg problems and devismg
workable, cost-effective solutions to them,
(m) excellent relatwnslnps With the pubhc and
other employees,
(Iv) a commitment to servmg the pubhc as the
chent, and
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67-19a-202. Powers- Jurisdiction.
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final admimstrat1ve
body to review appeals from career service employees and
agencies of decisions about promot10ns, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary,
violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and
disputes concerning abandonment of position that have
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the gnevance
procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdlction to review or dec1de
any other personnel matters.
(2) The,time limits established in this chapter supersede
the procedural time limits established in Title 63, Chapter
46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing,
or other proceeding, any member of the board may;
(a) administer oaths;
(b) certify official acts;
(c) subpoena Wltnesses, documents, and other evidence; and
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule.
1991
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67-19a-303. Employees' rights in grievance and ap·
peals procedure.
(1) For the purpose of processing a gnevance, a career
service employee may.

(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employee's choice to act as an advocate at any level of the
grievance procedure;
(b) request a reasonable amount of time dunng work
hours to confer With the representative and prepare the
grievance; and
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance
hearmg.
(2) The state shall allow employees to attend and testify at
the grievance hearing as Witnesses if the employee has given
reasonable advance notice to lns immediate supervisor.
(3) No person may take any repnsals against any career
service employee for use of grievance procedures spec1fied in
this chapter.
-t4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a
gnevance may not place gnevance forms, grievance materials, correspondence about the grievance, agency and
department replies to the grievance, or other documents
relating to the grievance in the employee's personnel file.
(b) The employmg agency of an employee who files a
grievance may place records of disCiplinary action in the
employee's personnel file.
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is
rescinded through the gnevance procedures established
in this chapter, the agency and the Department of Human
Resource Management shall remove the record of the
disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel
file and central personnel file.
(d) .A:n. agency may mamtain a separate grievance file
relating to an employee's gnevance, but shall discard the
file after three years.
1991
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PART4
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY
AGGRlEVED EMPLOYEE
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by
aggrieved employee- Voluntary termination
of employment- Group grievances.
(1} SubJect to the standmg requrreroents contamed m Part
3 and the restncbons contamed m tills part, a career serv1ce
employee may have a gnevance addressed by followmg the
procedures spee1iied m tills part
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grrevance rs
drrected may agree m wntmg to warve or extend gnevance
steps 2, 3, or 4 or the trrne hmrts specriied for those grrevance
steps, as outlmed m Sectwn 67-19a-402
"(3) Any wntmg made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be
subnutted to the adromrstrator
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the reqUlrements for
excusable neglect established by rule, 1fthe employee fa1ls
to process the gnevance to the next step wrthm the time
hmrts established m tills part, he has warved hrs nght to
process the grrevance or to obtam JUdrcral review of the
gnevance
(b) Unless the employee meets the reqUlrements for
excusable neglect established by rule, If the employee farls
to process the gnevance to the next step withm the bme
lmnts established m tills part, the gnevance rs considered
to be settled based on the decisiOn made at the last step
5) (a) Unless the employee meets the reqUlrements for
excusable neglect established by rule, an employee may
subrmt a gnevance for revrew under tills chapter only If
the employee subrmts the gnevance
(I) wrtilln 20 workmg days after the event grvmg
nse to the gnevance, or
(n) wrthm 20 workmg days after the employee has
knov, ledge of the event grvmg nse to the gnevance
(b) Notwrthstandmg Subsecbon (5)(a), an employee
may not subrmt a gnevance more than one year after the
event grvrng nse to the gnevance
(6) A person who has voluntanly tennmated ills employment wrth the state may not sub=t a gnevance after he has
tennmated ills employment
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same gnevance
they may subm1t a group gnevance by followmg the
procedures and reqmrements of thls chapter
(b) In sub=ttmg a group gnevance, each aggneved
employee shall srgn the complamt
(c) The adm=strator and board may not treat a group
gnevance as a class acnon, but may select one aggneved
employee's gnevance a.'l.d address that gnevance as a test
case
1999
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R137-l-2. Definitions.
Terms defined in Section 63-46b-2 of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) are incorporated by reference within this rule. ~ addition, other
terms which are used in this rule are defined below:

"Excusable Neglect" means the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person and constitutes
a failure to take proper steps at the proper time, not in
consequence ofthe person's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard m the processing of a grievance, but m consequence of some une:1>:pected or unavoidable hmdrance or accident.
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Department ofHumanResource Management (DHRM) rule R477-8-6(8)(c)(i)(ii)

On-call time: Employees required by agency management to be available for on-call work
shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of 1 hour for every 12 hours the employee
is on-call.
(i) Time is considered "on-call time" when the employee has freedom ofmovement
in personal matters as long as he/she is available for call to duty.
(ii) Employees record on-call time as "on-call paid" not as "hours worked" on
their time sheet, and shall be paid the following pay period. Any time actually
worked during the on-call period is recorded in increments of15 minutes as "hours
worked" in addition to on-call time.
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